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Mr. Chairman,
I align myself with the statement that was just delivered by the Italian Presidency of the European Union.
Events this past year have demonstrated that there is a need for enhanced tools at the global level for verification, inspection and analysis with regard to weapons of mass destruction. The IAEA is mandated to carry out verification and inspection of nuclear facilities. The CWC confers a similar mandate upon the OPCW regarding chemical weapons and facilities.
But when it comes to biological weapons and missiles, there is no international treaty or agreement on which to base verification and inspection activities. We are all aware that a major shortcoming of the BTWC is its lack of provisions on compliance monitoring. And to date, there are no international norms covering the production, stockpiling, acquisition and trade in missiles. The Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation is a step in the right direction, but it is neither a legally binding instrument, nor does it contain provisions concerning compliance monitoring.
What we do have, however, is a well developed instrument to carry out inspections regarding biological weapons and missiles. We have UNMOVIC. The legal framework for its activities is provided by Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999). We are all aware that UNMOVIC was set up for a specific purpose, and that its mandate is temporary. The verification, inspection and analysis expertise that has been built up within UNMOVIC and its predecessor UNSCOM has proven its value. It enjoys the legitimacy that can only be derived from the UN. The question is, what will happen to UNMOVIC when its present tasks have been concluded? And what can be done for the UN to retain its verification and inspection expertise?
Mr. Chairman,
Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), adopted on 22 May, underlines the intention of the Security Council to revisit the mandate of UNMOVIC as set forth in several earlier resolutions. To date, this has not happened, and UNMOVIC has continued with those parts of its mandate that remain operable. The Secretary-General’s fifteenth quarterly report on the activities of UNMOVIC is due around 1 December 2003. This report will hopefully prompt the Council to make a decision on the future of UNMOVIC.
Mr. Chairman,
I have asked for the floor to suggest two possible options:
1. Lately, discussions have taken place on how the United Nations Secretariat could be reformed in order to be better able to meet persistent and new threats against international peace and security, for example threats posed by states that are in non-compliance with international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, and the risk that non-state actors acquire weapons of mass destruction. To make UNMOVIC a permanent resource of the UN Secretariat could be a step in that direction.
2. Another option would be to transform UNMOVIC into a regular subsidiary organ of the Security Council, along similar lines as the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). To this end, a roster of experts could be established. Inspection and verification activities, carried out by experts provided by member states, could thus be activated by Council action, most likely in the form of a Council resolution in a given case.
Mr. Chairman,
As a non-member of the Security Council, Sweden wanted to take this opportunity to stimulate a discussion within the general membership of the UN. Our hope is to solicit support for the idea of retaining the verification, inspection and analysis expertise of UNMOVIC, in the service of the UN. Let me, without prejudging the outcome of such a discussion, round off by encouraging the Security Council to consider how best to retain the expertise vested in UNMOVIC.
Thank you.
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