1. We, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs
of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden have
considered the continued threat to humanity represented by the perspective of the
indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon states, as well as by those
three nuclear-weapons-capable states that have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the attendant possibility of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The
seriousness of this predicament has been further underscored by the recent nuclear tests
conducted by India and Pakistan.
2. We fully share the conclusion
expressed by the commissioners of the Canberra Commission in their Statement that
"the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used -
accidentally or by decision - defies credibility. The only complete defence is the
elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again."
3. We recall that the General Assembly of
the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution - unanimously
called for a commission to make proposals for "the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass
destruction." While we can rejoice at the achievement of the international community
in concluding total and global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the
Conventions of 1972 and 1993, we equally deplore the fact that the countless resolutions
and initiatives which have been guided by similar objectives in respect of nuclear weapons
in the past half century remain unfulfilled.
4. We can no longer remain complacent at
the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states
to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy,
final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we
urge them to take that step now.
5. The vast majority of the membership of
the United Nations has entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive,
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These
undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally binding
commitments by the nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We are
deeply concerned at the persistant reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states to approach
their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear
weapons.
6. In this connection we recall the
unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion
that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control.
7. The international community must not
enter the third millennium with the prospect that the maintenance of these weapons will be
considered legitimate for the indefinite future, when the present juncture provides a
unique opportunity to eradicate and prohibit them for all time. We therefore call on the
governments of each of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable
states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their respective nuclear
weapons and nuclear weapons capability and to agree to start work immediately on the
practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement.
8. We agree that the measures resulting
from such undertakings leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons will begin with
those states that have the largest arsenals. But we also stress the importance that they
be joined in a seamless process by those with lesser
arsenals at the appropriate juncture. The
nuclear-weapon states should immediately begin to consider steps to be taken to this
effect.
9. In this connection we welcome both the
achievements to date and the future promise of the START process as an appropriate
bilateral, and subsequently plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon
states, for the practical dismantlement and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in
pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
10. The actual elimination of nuclear
arsenals, and the development of requisite verification regimes, will of necessity require
time. But there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon states can, and
should, take immediately. We call on them to abandon present hair-trigger postures by
proceeding to de-alerting and de-activating their weapons. They should also remove
non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites. Such measures will create beneficial
conditions for continued disarmament efforts and help prevent inadvertent, accidental or
unauthorized launches.
11. In order for the nuclear disarmament
process to proceed, the three nuclear-weapons-capable states must clearly and urgently
reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons development or deployment and
refrain from any actions which could undermine the efforts of the international community
towards nuclear disarmament. We call upon them, and all other states that have not yet
done so, to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and take the necessary measures which
flow from adherence to this instrument. We likewise call upon them to sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.
12. An international ban on the
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
(Cut-off) would further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. As agreed in 1995 by the States Parties to the NPT, negotiations on such a
convention should commence immediately.
13. Disarmament measures alone will not
bring about a world free from nuclear weapons. Effective international cooperation to
prevent the proliferation of these weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter
alia, the extension of controls over all fissile material and other relevant components of
nuclear weapons. The emergence of any new nuclear-weapon state, as well as any non-state
entity in a position to produce or otherwise acquire such weapons, seriously jeopardises
the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.
14. Other measures must also be taken
pending the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Legally binding instruments should be
developed with respect to a joint no-first-use undertaking between the nuclear-weapon
states and as regards non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon states, so called negative security assurances.
15. The conclusion of the Treaties of
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as
well as the Antarctic Treaty have steadily excluded nuclear weapons from entire regions of
the world. The further pursuit, extension and establishment of such zones, especially in
regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represents a significant
contribution to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
16. These measures all constitute
essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel: by the nuclear-weapon
states among themselves; and by the nuclear-weapon states together with the
non-nuclear-weapon states, thus providing a road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.
17. The maintenance of a world free of
nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally
negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing
set of instruments.
18. We, on our part, will spare no
efforts to pursue the objectives outlined above. We are jointly resolved to achieve the
goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. We firmly hold that the determined and rapid
preparation for the post-nuclear era must start now.
Permanent
Mission of Sweden to the United Nations