Mr
President,
Let me begin by congratulating you on
your election as President of this Conference. Its success lies in your hands and I can
assure you of the support of the Swedish delegation in this important endeavour.
Sweden fully subscribes to the European
Union statement and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.
Mr President,
The late 80s and early 90s were a time of
hope. A time of great political change and opening towards democracy. A time when decades
of cold war gave way for disarmament and increased security. A time when the positive
developments led us to believe that the nuclear threat was history.
Today, at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, we must ask ourselves: What went wrong?
Thirty years after the entry into force
of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) we face a near stand-still in nuclear
disarmament negotiations. In fact, since '95 we have seen more set-backs than progress in
nuclear disarmament. The US Senate has refused to approve the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), while China and other states have not yet ratified it.
Nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan contribute to a deteriorating regional
security situation in South Asia. The situation concerning weapons of mass destruction in
the Middle East gives cause for concern. North Korea remains in violation of its NPT
obligations. The United States are making plans for a national missile defence system
which might restart the nuclear missile race. Are these temporary setbacks or are we
seeing the beginning of a new era of mistrust?
Out of concern for this situation, Sweden
together with seven other non-nuclear-weapon states and with the strong support of the
majority of non-nuclear-weapon states and the NGO community, launched a new initiative in
'98 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free
world. Today, there is still an urgent need to turn the commitment to the '95 Principles
and Objectives into practical disarmament steps. This meeting takes place at a decisive
moment in the nuclear era. Now it is time to get the process restarted.
If we do not act today, we, the
generation which rallied against nuclear weapons and for peace, will see our own children
demonstrating against us.
The NPT is based on balanced commitments.
The majority of states have agreed to forego the nuclear option in return for negotiations
in good faith, chiefly among the five Nuclear-Weapon States, towards nuclear disarmament.
Our common goal is a nuclear-weapon-free world. This is the foundation of the global
non-proliferation regime. The absence of negotiations on disarmament would risk eroding
the NPT regime.
In 1995, the Nuclear-Weapon States
committed themselves to a programme of action that included "the determined pursuit
of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally".
Some positive steps have been taken in
this regard. The systematic implementation of the START I treaty ahead of schedule, by the
US and Russia, is one. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by
France, the United Kingdom and the US, is another. We consider the Test-Ban Treaty an
important achievement and we also welcome the strengthening of the Safeguards system. The
efforts by some nuclear-weapon states to increase transparency in the disarmament process
and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards should also be
acknowledged. We also welcome the UN Disarmament Commission's valuable work on
nuclear-weapon-free zones.
However, this is far from enough. Let me
point out four areas of concern, where we lack progress or where we face new problems.
These are:
reducing nuclear weapons arsenals
bringing into force the CTBT
halting the development of new weapons
and systems; and
nuclear weapons in regional conflicts.
We need reductions in nuclear weapons
arsenals. Instead, thousands of strategic nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert. In
some countries there is a tendency to accord nuclear weapons a growing importance in
military doctrines and postures. This is unacceptable.
Although this certainly applies to all
Nuclear-Weapon States, those with the largest arsenals bear a special responsibility. And
the Swedish Government calls on the Russian Federation and the United States to accelerate
the process which, together with measures adopted by the other three Nuclear-Weapon
States, will lead to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. Sweden strongly supports
the START process and recalls the '85 joint US-Soviet statement and the commitments to
reductions in nuclear armaments to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear arms
everywhere.
While of course welcoming Russia's
ratification of the START II treaty, Sweden remains deeply concerned that it still has not
entered into force seven years after being signed and that negotiations on START III are
not yet underway. The Russian Federation and the United States must now assume their
special responsibility, bring START II and its protocol into force without further delay
and immediately begin negotiations on a START III treaty.
Sweden welcomes the unilateral reductions
in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some Nuclear-Weapon States and calls for
further cutbacks by the remaining ones – in particular the Russian Federation. We
also call for transparency in holdings of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These weapons
have outlived themselves and have no place in the 21st century.
We need the entry-into-force of the
Test-Ban Treaty. In this context, we warmly welcome the progress achieved through Russia's
on-going ratification. All other states that have not yet done so, in particular the
United States and China, should now follow suit. A special responsibility to show
immediate progress rests on India, Pakistan and North Korea, who have not yet signed the
treaty.
No states – and least of all the
Nuclear-Weapon States – have the right to hold our common security environment
hostage to domestic policies. Nor is it acceptable that differences between the
Nuclear-Weapon States on unrelated issues should interfere with their responsibility for
advancing the nuclear arms control agenda.
We need an end to the development of
nuclear weapons once and for all. Sweden remains committed to negotiating a Treaty on
fissile material based on the Shannon report, which would effectively prevent the further
development of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept attempts by China or any other state to
block progress on this crucial Treaty. China and all other States that have not yet done
so must immediately cease production of fissile material for weapons purposes and refrain
from further development of nuclear weapons.
My Government is deeply concerned about
the United States' plans for a national missile defence (NMD) system. Such a system could
run counter to efforts to halt proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Proliferation
must instead be met by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. A national missile
defence system would put in question the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) which is
repeatedly referred to by both States Parties as being a cornerstone of strategic
stability. There is a risk that such actions from the US jeopardise this balance, and have
negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I reiterate Sweden's
call on the States Parties to refrain from any deployment that could create uncertainties.
Russia and the US share the responsibility for negotiating a solution that will have a
positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
This said, the debate must not be taken
as a pretext for continued development of nuclear weapons. There is no excuse for
departing from the road towards nuclear disarmament.
We need a halt to regional nuclear
threats. In June 1998 India and Pakistan carried out test explosions of nuclear weapons.
This deplorable development constituted a serious blow to the global non-proliferation
regime. Far from improving the security of the States concerned, these nuclear tests set
off an arms race that constitutes a risk to peace and security in the entire region.
India and Pakistan must reverse their
nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1172. They both have a
responsibility to leave the path of escalation and return to regional security. Signing
the Test-Ban Treaty would be the first step in that direction.
The situation regarding proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East continues to be a cause for concern. Iraq
continuously tries to evade inspections to which it is bound by Security Council
resolutions. We urge Iraq to co-operate with the UN Monitoring, Observation and
Verification Commission (UNMOVIC). The countries of the region must take decisive steps
towards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a
zone free of weapons of mass destruction.
On the Korean Peninsula, Sweden hopes for
a solution to the nuclear situation, based on the "Agreed Framework" between the
US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Sweden, along with the EU, supports
these efforts through participation in the KEDO project. We urge all States concerned to
exercise restraint and to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. Meanwhile, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abide by its
safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT.
Mr President,
Sweden strongly supports the Safeguards
system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We have assisted several new
states of the former Soviet Union in setting up their own nuclear accountancy systems. We
welcome the approval in 1997 of a system which will strengthen the IAEA's ability to
detect secret nuclear weapons programmes. However, the rate of ratification of the
Additional Protocol to the Safeguards agreement must be speeded up. Sweden is now ready to
ratify the Protocol nationally.
Together with our partners in the
European Union we have also agreed to conclude our collective ratification process as soon
as possible and urge all other States parties to make the same efforts.
Illicit trafficking is a threat to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Swedish Government co-operates with several
states in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as with the IAEA, to improve physical
protection and prevent illicit trafficking. We call upon states to accede to the Physical
Protection Convention as soon as possible and to implement fully their ensuing
commitments. Thought should be given to co-operative measures, including verification,
which would strengthen world-wide physical protection.
Mr President,
My Government remains committed to
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, for instance in agriculture,
medicine and water resource management. I welcome the IAEA's efforts to align its
activities in this field more closely with those of the developing countries. Export
control has an important role to play in facilitating such co-operation while preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons.
Any activities relating to nuclear
applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards. All states that
have not yet done so should accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their
ensuing commitments.
Mr President,
Some of the problems that we discuss at
this Review Conference are a legacy from a bygone political era, missed by few. Others are
new, arising from regional conflicts and the political and economic reality of
globalisation. They do, however, have one thing in common - that today the prospects for
finding sustainable solutions are better than ever before. Provided that we have the
political will and commitment, that is.
This Conference offers an opportunity to
add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew our commitment to the
full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We cannot afford to let it
slip through our fingers.
Sweden calls on the Conference to commit
to the following steps:
To undertake unequivocally to eliminate
nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations
thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
To do its utmost, unconditionally and
without delay, to achieve the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty
To ban the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, through immediate negotiations as
agreed in the Conference on Disarmament.
To increase transparency regarding
strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and holdings of fissile material
stocks.
To let the principle of irreversibility
guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
Mr President,
We have four weeks to show to the world
that the global non-proliferation regime still stands strong. We expect the nuclear-weapon
states to implement their share of the NPT bargain. My Government will do everything in
its power to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
Thank you, Mr President
Permanent
Mission of Sweden to the United Nations