Talking points by Vitaly Churkin,
Permanent Representative of the
at the press-conference on the air incident in
on August 6, 2007
21 August
2007
The version advanced by the Georgian
side of the air incident on August 6,
The Georgian version of the August 6
incident began literally to fall apart when a group of experts from the
Ministry of Defence of
1.
Serious doubts exist as to the
reliability of the printouts and the digital copy of radar data provided by the
Georgian side.
These materials show a clear trace of
a “Russian intruder aircraft” crossing the border, but lack a number of other
objects, which at that time were in the air space of the region according to
the information of Russian objective control (provided to the Georgian
experts). Besides, Georgian radars did not reflect manoeuvres of the unidentified
aircraft in the vicinity of Tsitelubani village, particularly, the turn it made
according to the evidence of the eyewitnesses.
First information regarding a flight
of an unidentified aircraft, which dropped some kind of a weapon, was registered
by the peacekeepers in the South-Ossetian conflict zone at 6.40 p.m. on
August 6, 2007. They reported it at 7 p.m. to Marat Kulakhmetov, a Russian
general in command of the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) in
In order to eliminate any possibility
of tampering with the data using simple computer modelling, the actual
reliability of the Georgian radar data can be established with the help of
information on the location of the radar that was following the ‘intruder’. A request
of the Russian experts for this information was denied.
2.
The Georgian version of an emergency
launch in the vicinity of the Tsitelubani village of a KH-58 missile from a
Russian SU-24 aircraft contains a number of major inconsistencies.
Using a GPS navigator, Russian
experts took the geographical coordinates of the hole and determined that given
the position of the missile shown in images provided by the Georgian side, it
was to follow the course of 330 NW. If so, it could not be physically launched
or dropped from an aircraft following the course suggested by the Georgian side
for the intruder aircraft.
It is known that the charge did not
detonate. While the design of the KH‑58 missile and the technical
procedure of its launch from a SU-24 aircraft, which carries it as a standard
weapon, are such that if its engine was started (and that’s what happened
according to the Georgian side), it just could not fail to detonate. No
explosion can only occur in case of an emergency drop when the engine is not
started. There is no third option; and Georgian experts had to admit it after a
thorough explanation by our experts.
Furthermore, if the missile was
operating normally, it could not penetrate the soil at nearly full length
without damage, as the Georgian side claims. The plastic cover of the warhead
was to have been destroyed on impact against the ground. Only the heavier
fragments of the body could remain in the hole, such as engine parts or those
of the warhead.
The situation is different if the missile
was used in an undue fashion, for example, launched or just dropped from a
SU-25 aircraft, which is in service at the Georgian Air Force. Technically it
is quite possible after some alteration of the aircraft’s weapon hanger system
or the missile itself. Notably, during consultations Russian experts heard from
one of the Georgian military men that the unidentified aircraft appeared to
have ejected heat flares while manoeuvring. Unlike SU-25 aircraft, SU-24 are not equipped
with devices that create decoy targets.
However, it was impossible to check
the version related to these facts as Russian experts were not allowed to
inspect Georgian SU-25s.
3.
What the Georgian side demonstrated to
the Russian experts as remaining parts of the unexploded Russia KH-58 missile,
is, in fact, a group of separate fragments, of which only three could belong to
aerial munitions of this class, and namely section 4 and two rudders out of
four. There is nothing else to prove that this was a KH-58 missile. The other
fragments belong to different kinds of air weapons, the marking on some of them
shows this directly.
Over 2/3 of parts and skin of the
alleged missile are missing. The Georgian side gave no explanation why there were
no fragments of two rudders out of four. As to the central section with the
wings, the engine and the warhead, which carries the missile’s serial number
and year of manufacture, the Georgian side claims that it was entirely destroyed
immediately upon excavation from the ground.
The question arises, what is the
reason for such a hasty destruction of this fundamental evidence?
The material of the fragments that
were presented by the Georgian side as the remains of the missile’s wings have
nothing in common with titanium, of which alloys the wings of the high-speed KH-58
are made.
Among the remains of the “missile”
there is a small unit with a marking in English. Such a part could not possibly
be installed in a Soviet or Russian missile as components produced in foreign
countries are banned from being used for them.
Russian experts have established that
the preserved section 4 was separated from the central body with the help of a
metal sawing device with significant corrosion on the surface of the cut. This
makes it obvious that that particular fragment, which is known to be made of heavy-alloyed
steel, was separated from the body of the missile not on 6-7 August 2007, but
much earlier. Our request to make a spectral analysis of the carbon residue on section
4 to establish when it appeared was not granted by the Georgian side.
Thus, the Georgian assertion that
they found a KH-58 missile at the site of the incident does not reflect
reality. And the fact that the so-called “independent international experts”
have confirmed this version contradicts the above-mentioned literally glaring
facts and raises serious doubts regarding either their expertise or their
impartiality.
The question arises how could the separate
fragments get to the location to be later “found” by the Georgian side?
Unfortunately, the location where the
weapon was allegedly found has been brought to a condition that makes it
extremely difficult to establish the truth. For example, the Georgian side was
quick to fill in and level the hole, while examination of its edges could have
given important data to understand what really happened.
As it was said earlier, the Georgian
side very quickly destroyed the only part of the missile that carried its
number and date of manufacture, and now offers only photographs.
It is known that during the Soviet
period several air force regiments were based in
Having analysed all the information
given above, it seems logical to draw a conclusion that the KH-58 launch in the
vicinity of the Tsitelubani village did not occur the way the Georgian side is
trying to portray it. Fragments of
various air weapons were taken into that region and placed in such a way as to simulate
dropping that missile.
Doesn’t this explain the riddle of a
truly incomprehensible carelessness during visits of Georgian officials,
including President Mikheil Saakashvili, who in front of video cameras looked
into the hole, which was supposed to contain at least several dozens of kilos
of TNT.
On the whole, information and facts
gathered by the Russian experts during their work in