Mr President
For many of us this is one of the key debates of the General Assembly. I am delighted that the list of speakers is a lengthy one, as indeed it was last year and the year before that. The following remarks are complementary to those which will be made later by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Papua New Guinea on behalf of the members of the Pacific Islands Forum represented in New York.
Mr President
The issue of Security Council reform was prominent during the Millennium Summit where, as others have reminded us, our Leaders resolved to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Council in all its aspects. Many Foreign Ministers including my own, the Honourable Phil Goff, addressed the subject in their General Debate statements.
The question has to be asked, with all this interest and activity at the highest political levels, why is it taking so long to achieve a reform package that meets with the general agreement of which resolution 48/26 speaks? General agreement, something less than consensus but more than a two-thirds majority, in fact already exists on many key facets of the issue. There is general agreement on the need to improve the Council's working methods to make it more transparent and accountable; general agreement exists on the need to enlarge the Council to make it more representative; and, following Ambassador Holbrooke's statement on his country's position in the Open-ended Working Group in April this year, there appears to be greater flexibility on the question of overall size. Most of us also believe we have achieved general agreement on the need to curtail the veto, if it cannot be eliminated, in order to make the Council more democratic. This was graphically demonstrated perhaps by the acclamation which greeted the summary of the Chair of the Third Roundtable on this point at the end of the Millennium Summit.
It is New Zealand's firm view, Mr President, that everything hinges on what can be done about the veto power. This conclusion is by no means new or original; it has been recently stated far more eloquently by the Group of Ten countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia) in a paper they contributed to the Open-ended Working Group on 25 June 1998 which can be found in document A/52/47 at Annex XVI. The Group of Ten said, "General agreement on a comprehensive reform package is unlikely to be achieved without an understanding of the future scope and application of the veto". They went on to say, "Given concerns of Member States about the current scope and application of the veto, agreement on its possible extension to new permanent members may depend on the willingness of the existing permanent members to accept restrictions on its use".
Mr President, we soon heard what the Permanent Members thought of that idea when they declared here in New York at Foreign Minister level on 23 September last year, "any attempt to restrict or curtail their veto rights would not be conducive to the reform process". Throughout the deliberations of the Open-ended Working Group the P5 have consistently refused to engage in any meaningful way on the question of the veto. We are not among those who would seek to point the finger at any particular group for "blocking" reform, but this situation clearly needs to be addressed with determination if there is to be any progress towards the comprehensive reform mandated by our Leaders in the Declaration of the Millennium Summit.
For most of us, we are not here to see the veto proliferated Mr President, we are here, in light of the historic opportunity offered by the reform process, to do our best to wind it back. As our Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated in the General Debate, curtailment of the veto, if indeed it cannot be eliminated, must in New Zealand's view be at the heart of any reform. This anachronistic and anti-democratic power which was foisted on the Membership in 1945 has done considerable harm to our Organisation - witness the impasse in the Council over Kosovo in March 1999. Statistics advanced by the P5 on the rarity of its formal use these days are misleading; we all know the veto hovers everpresent above the Council's informal consultations; it is exercised by the raising of an eyebrow, a turn of phrase or studied indifference on the part of those delegations who possess it towards proposals from those who do not.
At the present time Mr President there is clearly no general agreement in support of a slate of new permanent members or what additional powers might be extended to them. New Zealand for its part has expressed support for Japan's aspirations, but it cannot contemplate any extension of the veto. Let us imagine for argument's sake how the Security Council might look if five new veto-toting permanent members were added as some seem to seriously propose. The P5 would become the P10. And what of the elected Members, those who every two years pass the test of their peers' good opinion? Why, even if they were increased by five or six in number they would become increasingly irrelevant given the well-known dynamics of the Council. In a short time only a very few countries capable of meeting the criteria in Article 23 of the Charter, which include a willingness to put one's citizens in harm's way in the service of the United Nations and the cause of peace, would bother seeking election. If there is a sure-fire way to harm our Organisation, which is uniquely founded on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members, then certainly it is to expand and further entrench an unaccountable minority holding the veto power.
As for the notion that some kind of "periodic review" might help impose accountability, this in our view is a chimaera. As is abundantly evident today, once a Member State has the veto power there is no going back. Article 108 of the Charter of course specifies that any amendments require the ratification of all the permanent members.
Mr President
The issues which come under this item and which are dealt with by the Open-ended Working Group are plainly highly sensitive. They go to the heart of national perceptions of self-worth, place in the geopolitical pecking-order or sense of entitlement. The Open-ended Working Group is uniquely mandated and equipped to deal with them. For whatever eventual outcome on reform is reached, it must be sustainable and it must enjoy the widest support - indeed the general agreement - of the Membership. Anything less would risk doing severe damage to the Organisation. That is why the Open-ended Working Group's transparency and open-endedness - any Member State can come and speak, no one is excluded - is so critically important. As my Minister also said in the General Debate, Council reform is too important a matter for back-room deals.
Mr President, the Working Group has withstood the slights of those who seek short-cuts and quick-fixes, all bound to end in despair, and will continue to do so under your guidance. The Working Group and those active participants in it who have served recently as elected Members of the Council have also contributed substantially to improving the working methods and decision-making of the Council. The Working Group has not least served as a real-time forum for drawing attention to some of the more serious deficiencies in the Council's working methods and decision-making as they have occurred. For these achievements alone it has proved its worth to Member States.
The task before this fifty-fifth session remains considerable, but the broad outline of a reform package is, as I have suggested, discernible where the lines of general agreement intersect. There are other possible elements, such as a reconfiguration of the anachronistic regional groups, which might allow for new smaller, more homogeneous groupings having common interests to coordinate more effectively than happens at present on who should represent them on the Council, subject to the General Assembly's ultimate endorsement. The key missing ingredient, however, is political will, including greater readiness on the part of those who have virtually untrammelled power within the Organisation to negotiate with the rest of the Membership on the veto power. We suggest it is on this score that leadership is now urgently required.
Thank you
Mr President,
I would like to note that for a number of years New Zealand has been fortunate to have had a close working relationship with the delegation of Argentina on the working methods of the Security Council, particularly on issues related to transparency. That delegation has informed me that it is happy to continue that relationship, and that it wishes to be associated with this statement.
I would also like join to with others in expressing our appreciation to the distinguished Permanent Representative of Namibia, Ambassador Andjaba, for his presentation of the report in document A/55/2.
The report continues the trend towards greater comprehensiveness. This too we welcome. We particularly appreciate the clear organisation of the contents of the report which allows for ease of reference by topic, chronology, or theme.
Mr President,
The period under review has been a very busy and productive one for the Council. We applaud for example the initiatives it has undertaken including the dispatch of Missions to East Timor and Indonesia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kosovo, and most recently of course to West Africa. In this regard we would emphasise the importance of the Security Council Mission scheduled to go again to Indonesia next month, as has been agreed with that country, given the continuing security problems in West Timor. We also greatly welcome the establishment by the Council over the past year of working groups to review or make recommendations upon thematic issues of particular importance including the protection of civilians in armed conflict and improving the effectiveness of UN sanctions.
We are very pleased to observe that there have also been significant strides made over the past year towards enhancing the Council's working methods, thereby allowing Member States non-members of the Council some of the rights afforded them in the Charter.
I refer in particular to the Note by the President of the Council (S/1999/1291) issued one day before the eve of the new millennium which includes several measures designed to - and for which Ambassador Greenstock acknowledged paternity in his statement earlier this morning. The note includes several measures designed to enhance the access of non-members to information and to participation in Council meetings. The fact that the Note begins by recalling a Presidential statement of December 1994 (when New Zealand and Argentina were last serving together on the Council) which contemplates an increased recourse to open meetings, is rather poignant. But then, what is six years in the scheme of things?
Mr President
As you will know the measures unveiled at the end of December last year include:
a) making available draft resolutions and Presidential
statements to non-members as soon as they are introduced to informal consultations
of the whole;
b) improving the quality of Presidential
briefings to non-members;
c) distributing briefing notes on field
operations to non-members in a timely manner;
d) and the stipulation of a range of
meeting options whose formats provide for greater participation by
non-members.
I would also like to mention the Note by the President of the Council (2/2000/155) issued on 28 February during the Argentine Presidency. This Note formalises a proposal, put forward by that delegation, that newly elected members of the Council be invited to observe the Council's informal consultations for a period of one month immediately preceding their term of membership. This proposal, at the same time as providing for more transparency, allows new members to acquaint themselves in advance with the customary procedures and practice of Council members at these informal meetings.
These steps towards increased transparency, even if slow in coming and representing a delicate compromise, are nevertheless very welcome. No doubt like many others, my delegation especially values the opportunity to attend briefings of the Council by senior Secretariat officials on items of importance to us, particularly where we are contributing troops. In our view the measures regarding the participation of non-members in Council meetings should be incorporated into the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, which in turn should be reviewed and finalised.
Nevertheless, despite this progress, implementation of the new procedures has at times seemed incomplete and uncertain. In addition, the undue preponderance of informal consultations of the whole, as compared with formal meetings, continued to be a feature of the Council's conduct of its business throughout the period under review. We accept that such consultations can have their uses but these should not include closing off the real business of the Organisation to the public. Rule 48 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure states that "Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public." In the view of our delegations this rule makes it very clear that the Council should as a general rule meet in public, only meeting in private or indeed informals under exceptional circumstances. This year's report however suggests over sixty per cent of the Council's business was conducted in informal sessions. We would also remind the Secretariat that the Security Council comprises fifteen members and that its practice of consulting on some issues only with the Permanent Five on occasion must stop.
Mr President,
The improvements in transparency I have touched on have not come about easily. We thank those members of the Council who have successfully promoted change over the past year. We wish the new elected members - Colombia, Ireland, Mauritius, Norway and Singapore - every success in the continuing effort to make the Council more democratic and accountable. We also pay tribute to the Open-ended Working Group on Security Council reform which has worked tirelessly to bring issues of transparency to the fore. We would reiterate that the Open-ended Working Group continues to be the appropriate forum in which to pursue reform of the Security Council. If, as one delegation suggested yesterday, there is indeed a minority "holding reform hostage", then clearly it is the Permanent Five on the question of the veto. The distinguished Permanent Representative of Canada a few moments ago referred in this regard to the problem of sclerosis in the Council.
Finally Mr President,
We look forward to the implementation of many of the improvements suggested in the Brahimi Report and we are pleased that the Council has established a working group on this important subject. The implementation of the recommendation at paragraph 64(d) of the report that "countries that have committed military units to an operation should have access to Secretariat briefings to the Council on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel" is of particular importance to us. We recall that our delegations were at the forefront of efforts in 1994 to establish the practice of regular consultations with troop contributors.
Mr President
The influence brought to bear by some members of the Council and by the General Assembly has achieved results. We are all aware of the heavy responsibilities of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. And we have recently been reminded by our Leaders in their Millennium Declaration of "the central position of the General Assembly as the chief deliberative, policy-making and representative organ of the United Nations". We are confident that under our President's guidance further progress will be made in improving the relationship between the Security Council and the wider membership, particularly the General Assembly, which is so critical to the overall health of the Organisation.
Thank you
Mr President
I would like, through you, to offer my delegation's congratulations to the new President of our General Assembly. We look forward to working with him, as we enjoyed and appreciated working with his respected predecessor.
Mr President
I would also like to join with those other delegations who have expressed their appreciation for the Secretary-General's excellent report contained in document A/55/1.
This report contains an eloquent account of how the United Nations has confronted major challenges over the past year in pursuing the objectives of sustainable peace and security. Indeed, through our own contributions to UN peace operations and especially our commitment of troops and civilian experts to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, we have some small understanding of the extent and complexity of the activities being undertaken by the United Nations today. It is essential that all of us join with the Secretary-General in helping to strengthen the Organisation's capacities in this area, including by acting upon the Brahimi Panel's key recommendations.
The Secretary-General has noted that many of the questions surrounding "humanitarian intervention" and national sovereignty, which he first posed last year, remain unanswered. Our own impression is that there is some polarisation among the Membership which needs to be put aside if the Organisation is to move forward. Yet the debate raises important issues which warrant careful reflection and we believe it is essential to work towards a consensus on improved ways of dealing with situations in which universally accepted human rights are being violated on a massive scale. At the same time, we see no inherent contradiction between intervention and national sovereignty in terms of the UN Charter. Article 2.7 of the Charter makes clear that there are circumstances where Member States do not have exclusive jurisdiction over their domestic affairs, in particular in the case of measures under Chapter 7 of the Charter. In other words the Charter provides that measures to preserve international peace and security can override state sovereignty. National sovereignty is therefore not an absolute.
If there is new ground to be broken in order to improve the Organisation's ability to respond more effectively, it probably lies in part at least in the domain of the Security Council which has the task of determining threats to the peace or breaches of it. The main impediment as we see it to the Security Council's taking concerted action to try to end massive human rights abuses, including in the recent cases of Rwanda and Kosovo, has been shown to lie in its decision-making processes. I refer of course to the veto by which the will of the wider membership of the Organisation can be continually frustrated. As we know, the veto is omnipresent in negotiations in the Council, even if it is less frequently deployed formally these days.
Mr President
The Secretary-General refers in his report to developments in the South Pacific region where the United Nations has become more involved recently. As one of the contributing countries to the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, I want to pay tribute to the very fine work being done by the United Nations Political Office, which comprises just three substantive staff, in helping further the peace process. The Secretary-General also makes the point that sustainable peace and prosperity can only be assured in Fiji if the aspirations of all peoples of Fiji, regardless of race, are taken into account, and all its citizens can play a "meaningful role in the political and economic life of the country". Finally, he calls our attention to Solomon Islands where New Zealand and Australia, working with the Solomon Islands Government, are helping to lay the ground for peace talks among ethnic factions.
Finally, before leaving peace and security issues, may I express our strong support for the Secretary-General's observation that future sanctions regimes should be designed for maximising pressure on the target to comply with UN resolutions while minimising their effects on the innocent.
Mr President
The Secretary-General in his chapter on development deals with many of the issues which received the greatest priority from our Heads of State and Government during the Millennium Summit. He refers for instance to the concerns of many countries, especially in the developing world, regarding globalisation. We will be particularly interested to learn of any mechanism the Secretary-General has in mind to enable him to fulfil the comprehensive responsibility accorded him by Heads of State and Government under paragraph 31 of the Millennium Declaration.
Finally, Mr President, my delegation is very pleased to see from the Secretary-General's report that important administrative reforms such as Results-Based-Budgeting are being taken up imminently by the appropriate Main Committee. We hope that there will be good progress during this session on some of the unfinished business remaining from the Secretary-General's 1997 management reform package. We note with satisfaction that encouraging progress has indeed been made in particular in the complex area of human resources reform. Sustaining meritorious performance from staff and managing them capably are fundamental to the Organisation's success. We believe this area has rightly been given top priority by the Secretary-General.
Thank you.