NEW ZEALAND STATEMENTS ON PEACEKEEPING
Mr Chairman
I would like to begin by thanking Mr Guehenno for his valuable statement before the Fourth Committee on 8 November. We welcome him into his new position and appreciate his openness and frankness.
Mr Guehenno referred in his statement to the "common constant theme" of the urgent need to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. New Zealand, as a contributor over many years to UN peacekeeping operations, fully subscribes to that view. We therefore greatly welcomed the presentation of the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations in August this year. The "Brahimi" Report represents a substantial contribution towards the goal of putting UN peacekeeping on a sounder footing. In particular we strongly support the Report's recommendations for a substantial increase in resources for Headquarters support of peacekeeping operations and, in the short-term, an emergency application of resources to allow for additional personnel in DPKO, along with the department's restructuring. The proposed increase in personnel will facilitate strategic planning, allowing the UN to deploy peacekeepers more rapidly and efficiently. We also welcome the report of the Secretary-General in document A/55/502 on the implementation of the measures recommended by the Panel. We look forward to continuing to work constructively and expeditiously with other delegations to help make those of the Secretary-General's proposals which require the approval of the General Assembly a reality.
In joining with others in support of additional funding for UN peacekeeping we accept totally the logic that there must be no adverse impact on development funding. Indeed this would be counter-productive; as the Secretary-General has recently observed in his report on the causes of conflict in Africa, peace and development are indivisible. In our view the apprehensions expressed here and there following the presentation of the Brahimi Report about the possibility of new resources for peacekeeping being at the expense of development are without any foundation whatever. We should put them to rest.
Mr Chairman
Our national experience in a variety of peace support operations has underlined the importance of contingency preparedness and sound advance planning. The Brahimi Report makes valuable recommendations in this regard. Pre-deployment training is also critical to ensure that when personnel are deployed they are able to carry out their tasks immediately upon arrival in the area of operation. We were pleased to see the Secretary-General's proposal for establishing training cells to conduct in situ training of mission staff . Such teams can be a valuable tool for inducting new personnel into a mission and promulgating a common understanding of its role and procedures. All of this training, both before deployment and during an operation, will help improve cohesiveness and efficiency and thereby enhance the impact of peacekeepers on the situation they face in the mission area.
We also welcome the Panel's recommendations on fair geographic and gender distribution in selecting mission leaders, and the steps the Secretary-General has identified to improve the selection process by means of a senior appointments group in which the office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues will participate.
While on the subject of staffing, we note that the safety and security of UN personnel serving on peace operations remains of real concern. There appears to have been an alarming increase in violent attacks over the past year. We welcome the Secretary-General's recent report on practical measures to strengthen security in the field and look forward to his proposals on the possibility of broadening the scope of protection offered under the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.
Mr Chairman
Under-Secretary-General Guehenno posed the question on 8 November whether Security Council Members - and in particular the Permanent Members - have a responsibility in adopting "challenging" mandates to ensure troops and police and the necessary logistical support are provided. We think the answer is clearly "yes". (It goes without saying that mandates themselves should be clear, achievable and credible, especially where the setting of force levels is concerned.) The Brahimi Report also noted that the five Permanent Members are currently contributing far fewer troops to UN-led operations, while of course acknowledging that four of them had contributed sizeable forces to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
In New Zealand's case thirty-one percent of our army is currently committed to UN operations, principally in East Timor but also with elements in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and Sierra Leone. During our own term as an elected Member of the Security Council between 1993-1994 we heeded the UN's call for help in Bosnia and Somalia sending troops to both these theatres, among others, which were very far from our own shores. Our contributions to UN peacekeeping do not preclude our participation in other arrangements including with SFOR in Bosnia and the MFO in Sinai. In our own region we continue to contribute to the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, and this weekend a party will deploy to the International Peace Monitoring Team for Solomon Islands, established under the Townsville Peace Agreement which was concluded last month.
Mr Chairman
We should take this opportunity to record our support for the recently introduced practice of the Council holding private meetings with troop contributors to an operation as has occurred in the cases of UNAMSIL and UNTAET. The frank and in-depth exchanges of views at these meetings have been of considerable benefit and can only enhance the effectiveness of UN peace operations. We look forward to their institutionalisation.
Finally, Mr Guehenno reminded us of the collective responsibility of
the international community for peace and security. Year after year we
have expressed our strong concern at the reimbursement situation. Delays
make it extremely difficult for smaller troop contributors to participate.
The fact that they are caused by some Member States failing to pay their
dues is intolerable. We call again on those Member States who are in dereliction
of their legal obligations, to make payment on time, in full and without
conditions.
Mr Chairman,
I am pleased to join with others in congratulating you and other members of the Bureau on your election. We also wish to express our gratitude to Under-Secretary-General Miyet for his statement.
One year ago when the Special Committee last met there was an air of pessimism about the future role of United Nations peacekeeping. The Secretary-General himself had spoken at Georgetown University in February 1999 about reluctance on the part of the Security Council to authorise new operations, leaving regional organisations to struggle with conflicts on their own.
Since that time there has been a sea-change for the better. UN operations have been established in Kosovo and East Timor, the Council has just recently approved a major expansion in the operation in Sierra Leone and it now has under active consideration the creation of a sizeable peacekeeping force for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.
For its part New Zealand now has over 900 Defence Force and Civilian Police personnel deployed on peace support operations. The majority are in East Timor where New Zealand has been pleased to play a significant role and where New Zealand personnel will very shortly transition from Interfet to UNTAET. But others are also serving as far afield as Sierra Leone, the Prevlaka Peninsula and in the Middle East.
Mr Chairman,
It is essential that this Committee concentrates during its deliberations on matters that will make an effective contribution to operations in the field and to the United Nations' overall capability to undertake peacekeeping operations. We welcome the changes adopted during the last regular session of the General Assembly, whereby the Committee's recommendations will from now on be considered in a resumed session rather than having to await the approval of a subsequent regular session. This should give added impetus to our work.
Today I would like to comment on just a couple of key issues given the time constraints we are under.
The first is the urgent need to make the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) a reality. We are disappointed that six of the eight posts remain unfilled and we suggest that this situation should be reconsidered as a matter of priority. The present need to draw on Secretariat staff for the start-up phases of missions is not conducive to good management. We believe the RDMHQ could have played a useful role in East Timor. We are very much persuaded that a fully-functioning RDMHQ could be critical to the smooth establishment of the operation that is proposed for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, in my delegation's view there is a continuing requirement for a comprehensive, preferably external, review of the structure of DPKO. Until this is complete one cannot really say whether DPKO is under-staffed or over-staffed. But we can say that troop contributors in particular have a strong interest in ensuring the Department has sufficient capacity and the right capabilities to meet its increased responsibilities. We would like to associate ourselves with those who have praised the dedication of DPKO staff over the past year under an unrelenting workload.
The second point we would make is the need to pitch a peacekeeping operation at the right level from the outset. Recent experience from East Timor suggests that providing a sufficiently robust mandate at the beginning of an operation, which indicates the United Nations' firm resolve, can lay the groundwork for a more orderly process later on.
In this connection however I would note that New Zealand and a number of other contributors to Interfet, the multinational force approved for East Timor, had hoped for the establishment of a blue-bereted operation from the beginning and certainly earlier than is now the case. We do not accept the doctrine which appears to have emerged rather subtly in various quarters which holds that UN peacekeepers should not be given a mandate for the restoration of peace and security in a difficult environment, and that such jobs should instead be reserved for coalitions of the willing. We consider the United Nations emblem still possesses a substantial moral weight which can have a tangible positive impact in highly charged situations, especially when there is suspicion, however unwarranted, of the motivations of countries taking part in an operation.
Nor do we regard the tendency towards voluntary rather than assessed contributions to support peacekeeping operations as healthy for the Organisation or for those Member States who need its help. And still the Organisation continues to struggle to provide timely reimbursement, as Under-Secretary-General Miyet has indicated earlier this afternoon, principally because of the arrears owing by the largest contributor. It has to be repeated that all contributions must be paid on time, in full and without conditions.
Finally I would like to acknowledge some recent improvements of practical
benefit to Member States in the way peacekeeping matters are handled. The
first is the circulation among the wider membership of the Secretary-General's
weekly situation report to the Security Council. This should have been
done years ago. Secondly we have noticed a perceptible improvement in the
quality of Troop Contributors meetings with better briefings being provided
and good exchanges of information between the Secretariat and Troop Contributors.
We would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the continuing
excellent work being done by the UN Mine Action Service and its dedicated
staff including its former Chief, Mr Tore Skedsmo. The Service's role as
the central coordinating body for mine action within the United Nations
is most valuable and must be sustained on a stable basis.
Mr President
May I begin by congratulating you on your decision to hold this open debate on a subject which remains one of the most important issues facing Member States. Could I say also that it is a particular pleasure to appear here under your Presidency, given the close collaboration, going back many years, between our two delegations on Security Council matters. Mr President, like others we welcome the thoughtful contribution of the Deputy Secretary-General and of Ms Bertini at the outset of this debate.
Three weeks ago in this Chamber many of us watched with astonishment video-taped testimony from a former UNITA guerilla to the effect that the shooting-down of two United Nations' aircraft in Angola in December 1998 and January 1999 had been deliberately ordered. This video recording was of course part of the report made by Ambassador Fowler to the Council on his visit to Angola in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established under Security Council resolution 864.
The two C-130 aircraft were carrying a total of 23 staff of the UN Observer Mission in Angola. The premeditated destruction of these aircraft would be one of the most flagrant crimes against this Organisation and its personnel ever recorded. According to the evidence presented on the video-tape, the soldier who fired the missile on each occasion was promoted as a result.
We hope the evidence brought back by Ambassador Fowler is thoroughly studied. It is essential the perpetrators be brought to justice, however long it takes. There can be no impunity for crimes of such a nature.
Mr President
In recent months Member States have also endured the murders of UNICEF and WFP staff in Burundi and the savage death of a UN official in a public place in Pristina, Kosovo.
The Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel, which my own country and Ukraine had a lead role in developing in 1994, and which of course New Zealand ratified some time ago, offers a framework for dealing with some of these crimes. But the protections offered by that instrument remain fragmented in their application until many more States have become Party to it. Furthermore, perhaps its scope does not go far enough. The categories of ‘UN operation' that the Convention covers are somewhat narrow. Recent examples of brutal violence against UNAMET personnel in East Timor illustrate the scope for possible broadening of the UN operations covered. Additionally, the Convention, crucially important as it is, does not accommodate humanitarian workers not specifically tied into the UN operation. This currently poorly protected group is in need of strengthened protection under international law. We are sympathetic to the elaboration of a protocol to extend the range of protection afforded by the Convention.
In this context, the inclusion of deliberate attacks on personnel involved in a humanitarian situation or peacekeeping mission in the Rome Statute as a war crime over which the International Criminal Court will have jurisdiction is a welcome step forward, and an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the plight faced by personnel in these situations. We hope that the Court will provide an effective forum for enforcing those protections which currently exist under international humanitarian law, and contribute towards ending the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of such attacks in the past.
Mr President
There is a particular category of UN staff to whose needs I would wish to draw attention today. They are those staff who are often locally recruited for a UN mission in a wide range of disciplines depending on the needs of the mission - interpreters, drivers, clerks and cleaners, whatever. Experience in East Timor in particular showed these people can become principal targets for violence because of their association with the United Nations. More must be done to ensure their protection, including their better integration into security planning for missions.
In conclusion, Mr President, we are glad the Council is seized once
again of this important issue and we look forward to some solid outcomes
from this debate.
Mr President
I want first of all to congratulate this month's President of the Council, the distinguished Permanent Representative of Slovenia, for arranging this open debate. The topic is a vitally important one. The question of how the international community through collective action can effectively prevent armed conflict has been much studied and discussed over the past decade.
We remember that at the end of January 1992 the Security Council, meeting for the first time at the level of heads of State or Government, asked the then Secretary-General to prepare recommendations on strengthening the United Nations' capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. The result was An Agenda for Peace whose precepts were to be sorely tested in peace-keeping operations in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia.
Other contributors on the subject included the then Foreign Minister of Australia, Senator Gareth Evans, who put forward the idea of "cooperative security". A further substantial contribution was made by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict in 1997. Among other things the Commission identified some of the chief impediments to preventive action. These included on the one hand a reluctance of countries closest to a conflict to want preventive assistance at the time when it could be most effective and, on the other hand, a certain "intervention fatigue" on the part of those states most capable of offering assistance.
Most recently we have to hand the valuable "action plan" offered by the Swedish Government in the pamphlet Preventing Violent Conflict, written against the background of the human catastrophe in Kosovo. At the regional level, the ASEAN Regional Forum is doing important work on the concepts and principles of preventive diplomacy. This renewed focus and discussion, including today's open debate, is most timely given the events of this year now almost passed, and the considerable resurgence in United Nations peace-keeping.
Mr President
The United Nations' Charter clearly envisages a strong conflict prevention role for this Organisation. Article 1.1 speaks of "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace". The second part of this Article also envisages the "adjustment or settlement" by peaceful means of "disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace".
The Security Council is given primary (but not exclusive) responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It exercises this responsibility on behalf of the wider membership. An impressive bag of tools is provided within the Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes at Article 33 including "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements" etc. The Security Council is also empowered, at Article 34, to investigate any dispute or situation which might give rise to a dispute that might endanger international peace and security.
The provisions of Chapter VII give the Security Council enormous powers to deal with threats to the peace or acts of aggression and impose serious obligations on the wider membership to assist the Council. Finally the Secretary-General is given a particular role at Article 99 that would seem quite relevant to the idea of "early warning" so often mentioned in discussions of preventive diplomacy. He is able to bring any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security to the attention of the Council.
The Charter, although more than half a century old, therefore contains a comprehensive, relevant and entirely practical set of options for conflict prevention, in the articles I have referred to and elsewhere. And it empowers the Council, primarily, to use them. If the Security Council has failed to carry out its responsibilities effectively in the past, it would not seem to be a failure of system design but a consequence of other factors.
Two key factors of course are political will and resources. Member States look to the Council members to show leadership given their special responsibilities. This includes at the very least timely, complete and unconditional payment of assessed contributions. It also includes a willingness on the part of Council members to ensure the UN will have the wherewithal to do the job that has been mandated, whether it is sufficient troops to defend a "safe area" or money to pay for the restoration of public services in post-conflict peace-building under the Council's mandate.
There is also a view that the Council's effectiveness in conflict prevention is hindered by its working methods. The Council does so much of its work these days, perhaps ninety percent, through informal consultations. Non-members do not have access. We are aware that among some Security Council members there is concern that this practice denies the Council the opportunity to invite representatives of States directly affected by a matter which the Council is considering to participate in substantive discussion of it. We can also envisage that there might be occasions when the chance for Council members to deliver a strong, collective and private view directly to the parties to a dispute could be a very useful step towards resolving it.
Finally there is that old incubus, the veto. As so many speakers observed during the General Debate of the General Assembly, this instrument wreaked havoc on the Council's conflict prevention capacity in 1999. It started with the untimely termination of UNPREDEP, a successful preventive deployment mission in a highly sensitive area. It exerted its unwelcome influence when the Council was by-passed in NATO's decision to bomb Yugoslavia. And it dogs the Council's efforts to arrive at a new weapons inspection regime to replace UNSCOM, which departed Iraq before Operation Desert Fox almost a year ago.
Mr President
Against these persistent negative features, which we hope can be resolved in the future, I am pleased to say that from my delegation's perspective there have also been some very positive developments in the Council's recent handling of its conflict prevention responsibilities. Perhaps the highlight was the rapid dispatch of a Mission of the Security Council to Indonesia and to East Timor in response to the violence following the popular consultation. The Mission was a crucial step in helping to end the bloodshed. The authorisation of the multinational force, INTERFET, and subsequently the Transitional Administration and peacekeeping force within it, were also done by the Council as quickly as the extraordinary requirements of one member's legislature would allow.
New Zealand will remain a significant contributor to INTERFET and to the peace-keeping operation which will succeed it, we hope very soon. While we are speaking on the subject of East Timor we would like to take the opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Holbrooke on his personal contribution to efforts to ease the plight of East Timorese refugees in Indonesia. And, in a completely different theatre, we would also wish to acknowledge the efforts of Ambassador Fowler as Chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee in investigating the illegal trade in diamonds and arms that has brought so much misery to that region.
Mr President
While the Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security there are other important actors within the UN system. There is a strong link between international peace and security on the one hand and disarmament and development on the other. If, as we believe the Charter intends, "international peace and security" is to mean more than absence of war or even an absence of the threat of war, the contributions of the other organs of the UN including the General Assembly and ECOSOC are of obvious importance in laying the foundations which are necessary.
Finally, Mr President, there is the role of the Secretary-General's special political missions. These are typically small-scale but effective interventions such as the UN Political Office on Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. UNPOB and the regionally provided Peace Monitoring Group play a critical confidence-building and indeed conflict prevention role as the parties to the dispute engage on the political issues concerned.
Mr President
The Carnegie Commission in its 1997 report Preventing Deadly Conflict spoke of the need to create a "culture of prevention". This included measures to deal with imminent violence, such as preventive diplomacy and early warning, and measures to deal with the root causes of violence, such as the promotion of well-being and justice. There can be no institution better placed than the United Nations to take on this multi-faceted task. We look forward to the Security Council continuing to carry out its key leadership role on behalf of Member States as part of this endeavour.