



Permanent Mission of
Malaysia
to the United Nations

(PLEASE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY)

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. HAMIDON ALI, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA AT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND RELATED MATTERS IN INFORMAL PLENARY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 26 MAY 2009

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for your paper of 18 May 2009, which is both an overview and a summary of the discussions of the first round of this intergovernmental negotiations on the reform of the Security Council. After weeks of deliberating on this subject since 19 February until we last met on 20 April 2009, re-instating our known positions and at times engaging into exchanges of views, our expectation is that we would have before us in this second round a composite paper so that we can finally begin negotiating on reform of the Security Council. Like many other delegations, we were looking forward in this second round to sit down and negotiate around the five key issues expounded in the first round of these intergovernmental negotiations. Considering the rather differing positions we have heard over the course of the last few months, our expectation was that we would see a paper in which the proposals which most found favour in the first round were detailed and submitted for consideration. This would have greatly facilitated our negotiations for this second round, and would have allowed Member States to progress beyond the re-statement of principles and positions. In fact, some delegations had made concrete proposals in the first round which could be considered further.

2. This notwithstanding, we note Mr. Chairman, that your paper of 18 May 2009, in particular paragraphs 14 to 17 give Member States sufficient leeway to negotiate, if we put our minds to it, and if we are serious about moving forward. In paragraph 16, for example, where you have listed down the various options for the veto rights, at least the three differing thoughts on this is captured, even if the nuance is not. So we have a choice of a) reforming the current veto, b) extending the veto to new members of the Security Council, or c) not granting veto rights to new permanent members of the Security Council. That much is clear, and was perhaps clear even from before the intergovernmental negotiations began.

3. But what is not inherently evident from a cursory reading of paragraph 16 is that choosing one need not necessarily preclude the inclusion of another choice. There are delegations, my delegation included, which were not in favour of extending the veto rights, while at the same time in favour of curbing the veto where it already existed. Thus, the simple choice provided in paragraph 16, of reforming, expanding or not extending the veto, is not as straightforward as reflected in the paper.

4. Abiding by your programme of work, I will limit my intervention of these paragraphs for now and would go into more detail on the elements contained in these paragraphs in Exchange 2 and 3.

Mr. Chairman,

5. My delegation also notes that record was kept of the number of interventions made under each and every key issue discussed in the first round of these intergovernmental negotiations. But just

because by the figures themselves many more States “engaged” actively in the intergovernmental negotiations as compared to the OEWG, it does not follow that positions were further crystallized or clarified. In fact, many delegations were merely re-stating their positions for the benefit of this intergovernmental negotiations, realizing that we are in the informal plenary of the General Assembly and that there would be a need to re-state our respective positions.

Mr. Chairman,

6. Malaysia is of the view that a review of the reform we eventually undertake is necessary in order to see – many years on – how effective the reform has been. It is during the review that we can tinker and fine-tune any shortcomings of the reforms we have adopted, to ensure that the system works as it should. A grace period of 15 years for the reform to work would be ideal, and would also allow Member States the opportunity to take stock of the contributions of those Member States which have benefited the most from these reforms.

7. Finally, Mr. Chairman, we acknowledge the challenge that you, and all of us, face in steering Member States into an agreement on several elements on an important subject on the reform of the Security Council. We understand the constraints which you yourself must face in chairing these intergovernmental negotiations. We are, however, confident in your leadership, in your ability to steer us away from falling back into the OEWG mode and to the final outcome of reforming the Security Council through this intergovernmental negotiations. We pledge our continued support to you in this endeavour, and look forward that at the end of Exchange 3, progress will have been made.

Thank you.