STATEMENT BY
MR MOHAMMAD KAMAL YAN YAHAYA
CHARGÉ D’AFFAIRES A.I.
AT THE OPEN BRIEFING ON THE REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS DURING THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
FRIDAY, 14 APRIL 2000
Mr President,
My delegation would like to express its appreciation to you, Mr. President, for convening this open briefing, today, on the report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The formal consideration of this first-of-its-kind document is overdue. For too long, the Organisation has shied away from acknowledging a serious flaw in judgement in its handling of the situation in Rwanda. The 1994 slaughter of the 800,000 lives still reverberates today and in order for us to exorcise this ghastly failure, we must muster the courage to accept and recognise, in all humility, our shortcomings. More importantly, we must learn from the tragedy and not allow a repetition of Rwanda in any part of the world.
2. In this regard, we would also like to express our appreciation to former Prime Minister of Sweden, Ingvar Carlsson, for introducing a sobering, critical report that catalogued in painful detail how the United Nations ignored abundant warnings of impending carnage and withdrew most of its peacekeeping force as the massacres began. We also wish to commend Secretary-General Annan for his decision in commissioning the report and for his courage in making a public expression of his profound regret and acknowledgement of responsibility. Malaysia believes that it is for the good of the Organisation that the truth be made known. We must restore the credibility of this Organisation and, more importantly, to contribute to the healing and reconciliation process of the Rwandan people.
3. Aside from its account of what actually happened the report of the Independent Inquiry is also noteworthy for the timing of its release. Its issuance, on 16 December 1999, came shortly on the heels of an equally critical internal report detailing how, in July 1995, the United Nations allowed the Bosnian Muslim safe area of Srebrenica to be overrun by Bosnian Serbs. Together, these inquiries establish an admirable new standard of candour at the United Nations. They can point the way towards to a more effective international action if similar situations were to arise in the future. We can only succeed if we are honest with ourselves and have a clear idea of what has been wrong up to now. We must strive for a clear set of criteria and guidelines on how to better implement and coordinate in future the whole range of United Nations activities in the area of peace and security.
4. The Report has clearly attributed responsibility for the limitations of the original mandate given to UNAMIR to where it belongs. It is clear that an inadequate and flawed analysis had underpinned the recommendations to the Council which had accepted the recommendation that the mission be composed of fewer troops than the field mission had considered necessary. UNAMIR’s mandate was cautious from its inception; it was to become equally so in its application on the ground. The mandate was applied in a manner which would preserve a neutral role of UNAMIR under a traditional peacekeeping mandate, one that was grossly inadequate to halt the genocide. This was the scope of action that was perceived to have support in the Security Council. Despite facing a deteriorating security situation, which should have prompted a more robust and preventive role for the United Nations, no steps were taken to adjust the mandate to the realities of the situation on the ground.
5. Council members must also share the responsibility - some obviously more than others. There was no will to deploy a more substantial force or to use "all necessary means" to protect civilians at risk. It is clear from the report that an adequate number of properly trained, equipped and supported troops could have averted the horrific tragedy.
6. It has often been said that UNAMIR was an operation which was established in the shadow of Somalia. In particular, the tragic deaths of United Nations peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 had a deep effect on the attitude towards the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The experience of Somalia appears to have had a constraining effect on the Secretariat, in particular with regard to the risks that could be assumed during peacekeeping operations and in respect to the interpretation of mandates. Nevertheless, while criticisms can be levelled at the mistakes and limitations of the capacity of UNAMIR’s troops, responsibility should also be shared by the great majority of United Nations member states, which were not prepared to sent any troops or materiel to Rwanda.
7, My delegation welcomes the commissioning, release and discussion of the Report. It throws much light into the circumstances surrounding the tragedy that engulfed Rwanda which is extremely useful to member states of this Organisation. However, many questions that should have been addressed by the independent inquiry were kept in abeyance. Such questions revolve around the identity of perpetrators and possible accomplices in the murderous attack that claimed the lives of the heads of states of Rwanda and Burundi. That attack, as pointed out in many parts of the report, served as a catalyst to the Rwandan genocide. We note that the report is based on evidence collected only from one side in the conflict, that is the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its collaborators. Similar interviews with other personalities in exile could have proved useful. Such exiles include members of the two successive transition governments before the assassination of President Habyarimana, as well as members of the first RPF government who had to flee the country. We think it useful, perhaps, for the independent inquiry to have included, in its recommendations, the setting up of a more comprehensive and detailed commission of inquiry on the Rwandan genocide. We believe that Rwandans do not mourn only the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were massacred in 1994, but also other Hutus and Tutsis who have been massacred before and after that period by extremists from all sides. Such an enquiry, while painful, would serve to bring this great tragedy to closure, thereby contributing to the necessary process of reconciliation between the two ethnic groups which is important for the future peace and tranquility of the region..
8. In the aftermath of the 1994 tragedy, we note the Organisation's admission that it had indeed learned some lessons from Rwanda. It had failed to respond to several warnings of the impending genocide. Six months before the massacre, for example, a report by the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva signaled what was to come, but the report never made it to the desks of senior peacekeeping officials in the DPKO, who might have acted on it. That failure of communication within the Secretariat and with the Security Council is less likely now. Still, better internal communication is not the whole answer. The United Nations’ ability to respond to crises can be only as strong as the will of its leading members to provide the necessary resources. It is regrettable that the Council’s failure to prevent the slaughter in Rwanda had led many to question its perceived selectivity when deciding to intervene in conflict situations.
9. The United Nations may not be able to meet all of the world’s many humanitarian challenges. But, this report from the Independent Inquiry, coming at the eve of the new millennium should be a turning point for this Organisation. The Organisation must make a difference to populations at risk. when ever and where ever they happen to be. The shame of the Srebrenica massacre was that the United Nations had stationed a token peacekeeping force in the town, large enough for it to claim that it cared about the fate of Bosnian Muslims, but too small to actually help them. The shame of Rwanda, likewise, is that the United Nations did send a token force to the region but then stood by as the horror unfolded. We must learn from the lessons of this tragedy and to come to terms with our acts of omission. In this regard it is imperative that we give serious consideration to the 14-point-recommedations of the report which, if adhered to, would ensure non-repetition of the tragic blunder made in respect of Rwanda. We must thank the authors of the Report for speaking out without fear or favour.
Thank you, Mr President.