



STATEMENT BY MR. NIRUPAM SEN, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS ON FEBRUARY 1, 2005

Mr. Chairman,

We congratulate you and other members of the Bureau on your re-election. We thank Under Secretary General Guehenno for the traditional statement yesterday morning that maps out the priorities in peace-keeping for the coming year. We assure him of our full cooperation and support in the performance of his tasks.

We associate ourselves with the statement delivered yesterday by the distinguished Permanent Representative of Morocco on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement.

Mr. Chairman,

The report of the Secretary-General (Doc A/59/608) addresses some important issues that have arisen consequent to the current surge in peace-keeping. First and foremost, the generation of resources. Key gaps continue to persist in the generation of enabling capacities that are so critical to the success of a peace-keeping operation. That there are only some member-states that possess these capabilities is axiomatic. It is ironic, however, that since the mid-1990s it is these states that have substantially reduced their contribution of troops and materiel to UN operations, particularly in Africa. We agree with the Secretary-General that for peace-keeping to be successful, it must be an expression of truly international commitment to peace and security. For too long, the burden of peace-keeping has been borne by the developing countries and we would urge the developed countries to share equally this load. While we, therefore, welcome the initiatives being advanced by the EU for battle groups and attempts to "*fill the gap*", earlier in UNMEE and now in UNMISUD, these must not and cannot be a substitute for the enhanced participation of the developed world in UN Peace-keeping operations.

The question of *rapid deployment* continues to fester. We share the DPKO's concern in this regard and are seized equally of the need to deploy rapidly and effectively. It must, however, be appreciated that democratically elected governments answerable to their electorates cannot take decisions in an arbitrary way on participation, without going through established procedures. Despite this, and in response to the UN's call at a time of particular need, we deployed the first Indian infantry battalion as part of the brigade group that has gone into the Kivus in the DRC within the 60-90 day period, as envisaged in the Brahimi panel's report. The Secretariat has now advanced the proposals of a strategic reserve and a standing police capacity to

further bolster its capacities to deploy rapidly and effectively. We have taken note, and remain willing to engage in constructive discussions with the Secretariat and other member states in order to carry the debate forward.

Mr. Chairman,

We note the emphasis placed by the Secretary-General for further *integration* across the UN system and beyond, while implementing mandates of complex peace-keeping operations. Regrettably, we have not seen much evidence of such integration, either in the field or at Headquarters. There is also a tendency to duplicate when a better and more optimal utilisation of existing capacities would be more appropriate. The much-touted Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), Brahimi's recipe for joint planning for peace-keeping operations, remains a 'work in progress'. Yet it is proposed to be supplemented by the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). This to us appears contradictory. If the Task Force is a 'work in progress', what then is the logic to design another mechanism whose mission is purportedly the same? More than creation of new mechanisms or infusion of extra personnel, there is a need to identify and address systemic problems.

Similarly, we feel that in our eagerness to embrace integration, we must avoid the temptation of adopting *terminology* that does *not* command *inter-governmental agreement*. The Secretary-General has stated in Para 6 of his report that the majority of the DPKO-led operations today have mandates that extend beyond the security-related tasks traditionally linked to the term peace-keeping, and hence they might be perhaps more accurately termed as 'peace operations'. The Brahimi report defines 'peace operations' as entailing three principal activities; conflict prevention and peace-making; peace-keeping; and post-conflict peace-building. These are three distinct elements and should not be combined. We have always believed that no matter how complex a peace-keeping operation, it must be distinct from post-conflict peace-building. Blurring of mandates often results in unrealistic expectations and unachievable mandates. While we can, therefore, support coordination in complex peace-keeping operations, we cannot support integration of various diverse activities being mandated by the Security Council for such operations. Moreover, the NAM has consistently held that the General Assembly should have the key role in defining elements of post-conflict peace-building. Complex peace-keeping operations or multi-dimensional peace-keeping operations are more accepted terms and may be employed, until there is an inter-governmental understanding and agreement on *all* the concepts involved.

As regards the integration of UN peacekeeping operations with the capacities of *regional and sub-regional arrangements*, born more out of the UN's own inability to muster up enough enthusiasm from member-states for operations far removed, we would continue to reiterate that this integration should not absolve the UN of its primary responsibility, indeed its commitment, that it took upon itself in 1945, to be the primary guarantor of international peace and security. While coalitions of the willing authorised by the Security Council may be considered expedient for enforcement actions, it is only through the UN that the broadest range of capabilities available to the international community can be brought to bear in a complex peacekeeping operations. The challenge is how to involve regional organisations without regionalising peace-keeping.

On another aspect of integration regionalisation i.e. *co-operation between peace-keeping operations*, contained in Paras 65-68 of the Secretary-General's Report, we would tend to be skeptical. We can agree that each operation is, to a large extent, *sui generis*, facing unique challenges, with different mandates and resources. We can even agree on the need to share information and analysis between regional missions. Where we disagree is on the sharing of assets and personnel of one mission in the region with those of another. We regard this as contrary to the practices and provisions allowed under the Charter.

We welcome efforts to *enhance African peace-keeping capacity* and take note of the recommendations contained in the Secretary – General's Report on "Enhancement of African Peace-keeping Capacity" (Doc A/59/591). We share close and historical ties with our African brothers and sisters and are ourselves involved in bilateral capacity building efforts in some of these countries. As such, we welcome the emphasis on training assistance but would like to make the additional point that this cannot absolve either the UN or developed countries from their responsibilities.

On the sensitive and delicate issue of *conduct and discipline*, we share the Secretary-General's sense of outrage and concern on acts of omission and commission that are alleged to have been committed by UN personnel in the DRC. And we say this not because our troops have been singled out as models of exemplary behaviour, but because we are convinced that sexual exploitation and abuse are totally unacceptable forms of behaviour. We would reiterate, in this context, our conviction that troops from democratic, multi-cultural and pluralistic societies with respect for tolerance and diversity are less likely to be prone to such misconduct. We have taken note of the recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report on the investigations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services into allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC (Doc A/59/661) and are willing to enter into a serious discourse on the issue, with a view to recommending concrete measures aimed at stamping out the problem.

The *safety and security* of UN Peacekeepers is an area of critical concern for troop contributors who continue to place the lives of their soldiers in harm's way, in pursuance of the UN ideal. Unfortunately, we do not seem to have made much headway from where we left off last year, in the field or at Headquarters. For one, there does not seem to be any policy on the Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs), not one at least that has been shared with TCCs. The cells appear to be somewhat hamstrung in their functioning, if not moribund. Security arrangements for unarmed Military Observers (MILOBs) and CIVPOL also need to be clarified. At Headquarters, it has been proposed to locate an outpost unit of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) in the DPKO consisting of seven Support Account posts dedicated to support for Peacekeeping Operations. However, several critical issues remain outstanding. The relationship of the unit with the Department, the accountability framework between DSS and DPKO, approach to be adopted by DPKO in the context of the transition to the new security management system are some of the issues to which we hope to receive feedback from the Secretariat, in the coming weeks. In this context, we take note of the resolution

adopted by the General Assembly in December, 2004 on the report of the Secretary-General on the new security management system.

India has been a leading proponent in the critical area of *cooperation among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the troop contributing countries*. Regrettably, however, TCC meetings under the 1353 mechanism continue to be held on the eve of renewal of mission mandates, or even worse when a draft resolution is being negotiated in the Council. The reports of the Secretary-General continue to be distributed to TCCs at the eleventh hour, leaving little scope for serious or meaningful discussions in these meetings. The interface of TCCs with the Council is minimal, and with the Secretariat, far from optimal. TCCs need to be involved *early and fully* in all aspects and stages of Mission planning. Their views, if found reasonable, must find their way into Mission mandates. The Council and the Secretariat can only benefit, for the TCCs are the ones on the ground, best placed to render advice.

Mr Chairman,

India has a proud history of UN peacekeeping dating back to its inception in the 1950s. We have contributed a total of over 70,000 troops, participated in 38 missions and, for most of this time, have headed the list of troop contributors. We continue today to build on that tradition. In response to the Secretary-General's call for increased representation of *female personnel* in field missions, we have sent lady Military Observers to UNMEE, MONUC and ONUB. We are also considering the despatch of a platoon of female police officers to UNMIK in the upcoming rotation of our formed units. The role that women professionals in uniformed services can play in reaching out to the most vulnerable sections, i.e. women and children, in any post-conflict society is indeed unique.

Mr Chairman,

We have highlighted only *some* of the issues that we see as key in the upcoming discussions of this important Committee. We look forward to constructive and meaningful outcomes as a fruition of our joint efforts in what is arguably the most tangible activity of the United Nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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