



**STATEMENT BY MR. V.K. NAMBIAR, PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVE ON THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE  
AND SECURITY CAUSED BY TERRORIST ACTS AT THE  
SECURITY COUNCIL ON JULY 29, 2003**

Mr. President,

At the outset, I should like to congratulate you on your successful stewardship of the Security Council in July when the Council has addressed some of the most pressing issues confronting us in Africa and the Middle-East, while also allowing for a detailed review of the performance of the Council's Committees on Terrorism.

We thank you for including in your work programme, consideration of the 1267 (Al-Qaeda and Taliban) Committee and its Monitoring Group. A review of the work of this Committee is particularly timely and essential, given the propensity of organisations like Taliban and Al Qaeda to strike at will at different parts of the world, but equally owing to disturbing recent developments in Afghanistan's southern and south-eastern borders, indicating the regrouping and increasingly damaging activism of the Al Qaeda and Taliban there. It is vital that all members of the international

community are united in their preparedness and, more important, willingness to tackle this growing menace.

In its first report since the adoption of resolution 1455, the Monitoring Group has correctly concluded that despite some marked successes in the fight against terrorist groups, recent events have demonstrated that the Al-Qaeda and its associated groups still pose a significant threat to international peace and security. The fight against terrorism can be addressed truly and effectively only when all nations realise that terrorism is a malaise that can strike at will in any part of the world, including those societies that currently may see a vested interest in encouraging such tendencies.

Mr. President,

India has been at the forefront of the fight against terrorism for over two decades. Only last week, at least 14 persons

were killed in the State of Jammu & Kashmir in India as a result of terrorist attacks against pilgrims and at an army camp. While there is no direct evidence of the involvement of the Al-Qaeda or the Taliban in these attacks, the motivating factors and the sponsors of such operations are one and the same. Yesterday there was an additional bomb blast in the city of Mumbai.

I shall now briefly touch upon some aspects of the report of the Monitoring Group to which I append my delegation's comments. These are as follows:

(i) The Monitoring Group has concluded that the Committee's list only includes a small sub-set of known Al-Qaeda operatives.

We understand that the Afghan government has, in a welcome development, recently proposed certain changes to the Taliban section of the Committee's list. Resolutions 1390 and 1455 make it incumbent upon States to list any member of the Taliban and Al Qaeda organisation, and any individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda organisation. In our view, Member States should be proactive in proposing all names available with them for inclusion on the list, including those who had participated in training camps or other activities associated with the Taliban/Al-Qaeda. Without such an exhaustive listing, the Committee would be

severely handicapped in the implementation of its mandate.

(ii) The Group has drawn attention to the possibility of Al-Qaeda's access to nuclear and chemical weapons.

India has cautioned consistently against the potential dangers of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We had piloted a consensus resolution on this issue in the 57<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly. We urge the Committee to place emphasis on the study of possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among non-State actors such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

(iii) The Group has commented adversely on the continued ability of the Al-Qaeda to finance its activities through charities and the drug trade. It has also commented on the ineffectiveness of the travel ban on members of the Al-Qaeda; continued use of small arms and light weapons and the possible flow of illegal weapons across States resulting in increased attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan and the use of heavy calibre weapons in the Afghan region bordering Pakistan, raising questions as to how and by whom such weapons and ammunition were being supplied.

The nexus between drug smuggling and terrorism, the organised flow of arms across Afghanistan's borders and the increasing attacks on coalition forces tell their own tale of complicity and deceit. All of the

above conclusions of the Group indicate the limitations of the sanctions regime when applied to nebulous non-State grouping such as the Al-Qaeda and Taliban which transcend boundaries and utilise non-formal systems to attain their logistical objectives. In the light of these conclusions, it is perhaps necessary for a more in-depth expert examination of new tools that could be applied to make sanctions more focused and effective against such terrorist groups.

On the question of procedure, we note that in some instances, evaluation of proposals for listing of individuals tends to be coloured by extraneous considerations and political perspectives, thereby not only delaying but discouraging States from making genuine recommendations. While, to some extent, this may well be the objective of a jaundiced scrutiny by some, it is necessary for the Council to revise procedures that would make it necessary for States to communicate their approval for such listing within a very limited and defined period of time.

As of now, it appears that only 64 Member States have responded to the call in resolution 1455 to all States to submit an updated report to the Committee within 90 days of its adoption. In our collective effort to strengthen the fight against terrorism, the Committee should take measures to ensure that the tradition of prompt reporting is maintained, and is

followed up thereafter by detailed analysis of the inputs provided by Member States.

We fully support the proposal to supplement the Monitoring Group with additional human resources who could assist in the analysis of reports of member States. Inputs received in the form of reports by Member States will form a valuable data-base for the Committee and it is for this reason that the Monitoring Group needs to be adequately equipped to present the best analysis of this resource to the Committee.

We also support the on-going efforts to secure the requisite coordination in the work of the 1267 and 1373 Committees of the Council. These could serve to avoid duplicating calls for information in areas where such inputs are already available with one of the two Committees.

While concluding, I wish to congratulate H.E. Mr. Heraldo Munoz, the Permanent Representative of Chile, for his assumption of the Chairmanship of the 1267 Committee. The Chair has already shown considerable initiative in overseeing the implementation of the provisions of resolution 1455 and devotion to the international community's fight against the threat posed by the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. We wish him and his able delegation the very best in this noble endeavour. We cannot help but agreeing with the conclusion that the Monitoring Group's work can only be

meaningful if all States take concrete measures against the individuals and entities on the Committee's list. The will of the international community, to enforce the collective provisions enshrined in the Security Council's

landmark resolutions against terrorist organisations and their supporters, can only be as strong as its weakest link will allow.

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