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SCR 1441 (2002) states in the preamble that the
effective operation of UNMOVIC, as the successor organization to the
Special Commission, and of the IAEA is essential for the
implementation of SCR 687 and other relevant resolutions. In paragraph
7 it sets out a number of revised and additional rules to facilitate
the inspectors’ work in Iraq. The present organization of UNMOVIC is
based on the organizational plan submitted to the Security Council on
April 6, 2000 by Hans Blix in accordance with paragraph 6 of SCR 1284
and approved by the Council in a letter from its president to the
Secretary-General on April 13, 2000. The plan (S/2000/292) itself
provides, in paragraph 3, for the possible revision of the commission’s
structure and personnel according to developments and future needs.
The purpose in strengthening the regime is to
increase the effectiveness of inspections: they must be more
intensive, more carefully targeted, more intrusive. Our approach is
based on the need to compel Iraq to cooperate by taking the peaceful
approach of intrusive inspections. To do this, it is necessary for the
inspections to be carried out to their logical end, with the political,
technical and material support of member States. The idea is to make
sure that the present system submits the Iraqi authorities to
continued pressure, and that they have no choice other than to "cooperate
immediately, unconditionally and actively" with the inspectors as
required under SCR 1441. The inspections were designed from the
outset as a necessary intrusive instrument to ensure the elimination
of banned Iraqi programs. Their role has always been conceived as
compelling the Iraqis to comply with their obligations.
1. Proposals
Strengthening Numbers and Diversifying Personnel
The objectives are to widen the geographic coverage
of the country by increasing the number of inspectors in various parts
of the territory, intensify the inspections (increasing the number and
frequency of inspections), make them more intrusive, and lastly enable
the inspectors to deal with sites that are widely spread out. The
effectiveness of the inspections in terms of disarmament and
containment would be increased. Such measures would make it much more
difficult for Iraq to attempt any concealment.
There are about 110 UNMOVIC inspectors and nine
IAEA inspectors in Iraq at this time. On average ten teams are in the
field every day. So far, roughly half the designated sites have been
inspected. If the number of inspectors is doubled (240) or tripled
(360), then the number of daily inspections is doubled or tripled also.
Aside from doubling or tripling the number
inspectors and inspections teams in the present specialties (chemical,
biological, ballistic and nuclear weapons), other types of personnel
and experts should be recruited:
- the security unit set up to protect the
inspectors’ facilities could be significantly reinforced so as to
monitor certain suspicious sites or sites already inspected in cases
where UNMOVIC and the IAEA believe it necessary. Such personnel could
also intervene in the framework of SCR 1441 which stipulates that the
inspectors are authorized to freeze activity at a site, at least at
the most extensive sites.
- To probe still further, UNMOVIC and the IAEA need
not only arms experts but also experts in customs and accounting,
archivists and other experts who can help improve their understanding
of the nature of Iraqi proliferation programs on the basis of
administrative, budgetary, financial and customs documents and
archives, etc. An understanding of these aspects of Iraqi programs
could allow UNMOVIC and the IAEA to proceed with more intrusive
missions, including in archive centers.
- Administrative and technical support personnel
and translators/interpreters to and from Arabic should be increased in
proportion.
- Mobile customs teams should be established to
check on the nature of goods entering Iraq and make sure there are no
prohibited goods (military equipment barred under SCR 687 and dual-use
goods included on the GRL and not approved by the 661 committee).
Convoys would not be stopped systematically, but UNMOVIC could inspect
cargos at will.
- UNMOVIC has a regional office at Mosul and will
soon have one in Basra. Given the geographic distribution of the sites
to be inspected, these two regional offices can cover the country well
enough. An office in the west of the country would be useful
nevertheless, particularly to serve as a base for the above-mentioned
mobile customs units.
Strengthening Technical Resources
Aerial suveillance in particular must be increased.
This would make it possible to conduct systematic sweeps over Iraqi
territory and permanently monitor all the sites. Above all, the
specific characteristics of each type of aircraft would make it
possible to prepare and accompany inspections. They would enable
UNMOVIC to promptly identify sites at which movements or changes may
have been detected, and to send an inspection team immediately. Aerial
reconnaissance would also ensure that once the inspectors have left a
site it remains "frozen." Surveillance at that frequency
would reveal any possible efforts at concealment.
The aim is also to facilitate data collection and
processing from national intelligence services. UNMOVIC and IAEA
officials responsible for collecting such data could be mandated by
Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei to establish a joint center or bureau,
organically attached to both UNMOVIC and the IAEA. The bureau could be
located in New York (or Vienna). It would be authorized to request,
receive and process data from (1) national intelligence services and
(2) information collected by UNMOVIC aerial reconnaissance. The
structure should be kept relatively light, made up of five to ten
high-level experts, especially photo-analysts. At the same time, the
services of member States would be invited to cooperate more closely
among themselves and to systematically send information to the UNMOVIC
and IAEA coordination center.
Enhancing Methods
The objective is to have UNMOVIC and the IAEA draw
up a complete list of unresolved disarmament questions in order of
importance. The idea is to have a clear, precise and objective picture
of the problems that still have to be clarified. It is not only to
identify completely all the remaining outstanding issues but also to
evaluate their importance and degree of priority. It is important to
push the Iraqis up against a wall and not leave them any way out
regarding the questions which they must answer and on which really
active cooperation is expected. Such an exercise would also be useful
in evaluating the nature of the threat Iraq represents.
The inspections should be organized and planned so
as to move forward systematically in elucidating each of the
outstanding questions. An order of priority needs to be established,
along with a time-frame. A progress-report, or assessment of the lack
of progress, in various identified areas should be made at regular
intervals.
Placing a Coordinator in Iraq
Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei are not in Iraq all the
time. It would be particularly useful for them to have a
representative in Baghdad who could act as a relay for them and at the
same time serve as an interlocutor with the Iraqi authorities on a
day-to-day basis. Such a representative could also be responsible for
coordinating UNMOVIC and IAEA activities on the spot. On a daily basis
he would synthesize the questions and problems and liaise with the
Iraqi authorities. He would be responsible for synthesizing the
interim progress reports on each question at regular intervals.
2. Implementation
Our intention is to implement these proposals in
close liaison with UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Naturally, the modes of
application of these various proposals should be decided as a priority
by Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei.
UNMOVIC and the IAEA have sufficient funding in
reserve to strengthen the inspections mechanism as envisioned. UNMOVIC
has accumulated resources from the two and half years it was in
existence before the inspectors returned to Iraq, and during that
period its expenditure was far less than its resources. The commission’s
account continues to be regularly funded as Iraq continues to export
oil (0.8% of oil receipts paid into an escrow account).
With regard to personnel, the UNMOVIC roster lists
about 350 experts, including the 110 inspectors already there.
Rotations are currently planned every three months. Accordingly it is
possible to double the inspection staff immediately by extending the
length of stay and immediately mobilizing the rest of the experts on
the list. The numbers could be tripled quickly as experts can be
selected and trained without delay. Training sessions, by groups of
60, last from three to five weeks.
Regarding technical resources, several countries
have announced they are ready to provide immediately additional
reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to the U2s, the following are
available: Russian Antonov, French Mirage IV and German drones.
ANNEXE
Excerpts from the French Foreign Minister’s
Remarks
to the Security Council, February 5, 2003
"[To strengthen the inspections regime], we
must define with Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei the requisite tools for
increasing their operational capabilities:
- Let us double or triple the number of inspectors
and open up new regional offices. Let us go further: could we not
establish a specialized body to keep under surveillance the sites and
areas already inspected?
- Let us substantially increase the capabilities
for monitoring and collecting information on Iraqi territory. Here,
France is ready to provide full support; it is ready to deploy Mirage
IV reconnaissance aircraft;
-Let us collectively establish a coordination and
data- processing center that would supply Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei,
in real time and in a coordinated way, with all the intelligence
resources they might need;
-Let us list the unresolved disarmament questions
and rank them by importance;
-With the consent of the leaders of the inspections
teams, let us define a demanding and realistic time-frame for moving
forward in the assessment and elimination of the problems.
"This enhanced regime of inspections and
surveillance could be usefully complemented by having a permanent UN
coordinator for Iraq’s disarmament, stationed over there and working
under the authority of Mr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei."
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