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The countries in the region are doing
their best to persuade the Iraqi president to leave for exile. What is
France's latest position on this issue?)
It has not changed. For us, what
matters is Iraq's disarmament.
(And exile for the Iraqi president? Do
you agree with that position?)
It's not one of the issues we're
working on. We're working on Iraq's disarmament, so it is an issue on
which we have no comment. That's our position.
(When Mr. de Villepin speaks of active
cooperation on the part of Iraq to avert war, does that means that
such cooperation has so far been passive? Are there specific actions
on the part of Iraq which might reflect that passivity?)
We are guided by the idea that the
inspections, to be completely successful, must take place in a logic
of collective action and cooperation. Not a passive logic, a logic of
cooperation and responsibility. It's essential we mobilize more, that
everyone mobilizes more, and Iraq must be the first to do so. It's
essential to ensure that the inspection regime is completely
effective. The inspections are taking place in satisfactory conditions
and, as the minister has said, more must be done.
(Has Iraq refused a request from the
inspectors?)
Certainly not, so far as we know, but
we're following the situation closely and waiting each time to hear
the inspectors' reports and evaluations. They've briefed the Security
Council several times already and will continue doing so; so the
effort must be kept up, must be sustained. At this time the
inspections are taking place in satisfactory conditions, but it is
possible to do still more, to go further.
In the opinion of Mr. Blix and Mr.
ElBaradei, whom we support, there are gray areas in Iraq's programs,
past and present, and ambiguities in Iraqi statements. They must
cooperate still more actively and do more to clarify these areas. We
want to have certainties.
(The fact that France is insisting on
active cooperation, does that mean that if the Iraqis were identified
as actually being passive, that would encourage us to be less passive
alongside some of our allies?)
As the minister said, the recourse to
force would be a last resort, obviously. We've also said that the
status quo in Iraq is not acceptable and that we wanted to see Iraq
disarmed. There's no reason to anticipate; there is reason at every
stage to ensure that the international community, every state, faces
up its responsibilities, including Iraq, in close liaison with UNMOVIC
and the AIEA. So we don't put the question in quite the terms you did.
At each stage, we're assessing the situation, at each report by Mr.
Blix and Mr. ElBaradei, the Security Council is involved; that's
important because in our view it guarantees that this matter is being
guided at the political level according to the rules of international
legality, the condition for international legitimacy which guarantees
our effectiveness. The requirement that international action be
legitimate fully justifies the recourse to the Security Council
because there are no other ways. Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei regularly
brief the Council on the progress in the work, on the gray areas, on
the need for further explanations that they may identify, on
everything that is going well and everything that could be better; and
we're saying in this context, that we have to work for the complete
success of these inspections. They are taking place in satisfactory
conditions as I said earlier, but more must be done.
(In a statement to an international
agency, Mr. Blix, whom you're meeting Friday, expressed concern at the
increasingly rapid pace of the US build-up in the Gulf. Is it a matter
of concern to France?)
No comment.
(Are Russia and China on the same
wavelength as France in how to deal with the Iraqi problem in the next
few weeks?)
We share the same objective--Iraq's
disarmament. Our analyses coincide, we think the present
approach--giving the inspection process every chance so that the
mission can be carried out effectively in satisfactory
conditions--which the Security Council endorsed, is the best one.
That's the approach at this time.
(In France 77% and in Germany 80% of
public opinion are opposed to their respective countries' intervening
in Iraq with the US, according to certain polling institutes... Are
France's decisions in this matter based on public opinion in France or
on the higher interests of the nation? Does France consider the
absence of war in Iraq is in its interest?)
Those are two distinct questions.
Regarding the first question, it is
addressed to the highest political authorities. Insofar as it's a
question that is hypothetical at this time, I must refer you to the
said political authorities. Today, as I just said, we're not engaged
in a hypothetical recourse to force--that is a last resort--we're
working for the success of the mechanism set up under resolution 1441.
At this stage, the inspections. We're at this point.
Regarding your second question: I don't
think one can answer that question so schematically. One must always
take circumstances into account. The picture is not the same, as the
French authorities have said before, according to whether we're facing
the collective resolve of the UN confronting an unacceptable
situation, believing that there is no other recourse than to consider
the possible use of force in accordance with resolution 1441; or a
different example in which the conditions may not be there. So an
answer in the absolute is not possible.
What is certain is that we consider
Iraq's disarmament to be in the interest of the international
community and if it can be achieved through peaceful means and the
inspections regime set up under 1441, it's preferable. That's why we
say that war is the last resort. However, there may be cases, as you
know, where the last resort turns out to be necessary. So I cannot
reply to your question in the absolute.
(Everyone has to make an effort, not
just Iraq. Do you consider that the US is actively cooperating with
the inspectors or passively, and will the US have to send all its
military to the region to convince Iraq to go for a peaceful solution
eventually? Is that justifiable?)
I have no comment on your second point.
Regarding your first point. The
minister said the logic for the inspections is collective
action. Not passive logic, but a sense
of responsibility and action guiding us. That logic can be invoked and
put to use in Iraq itself. That is the sense of the minister's letter
to the Security Council.
Active cooperation is the cooperation
of all, Iraq first and everyone.
(The minister asked every country to
share with the inspectors any intelligence it may have about Iraqi
arms. Have you seen any positive reaction from the Americans since the
letter?)
I'm not Mr. Blix's spokesman, but he
said just this morning that UNMOVIC had received Western intelligence
and that thanks to this information UNMOVIC had widened its searches
in Iraq. So the reply, according to Mr. Blix, is affirmative.
(...) (Is there going to be a
time-limit on the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq?)
We believe, as Mr. ElBaradei said
yesterday, that the inspections are a way for us to be sure of having
the best chance of ascertaining whether Iraq has weapons or not. We
want the assurance that Iraq has not acquired weapons of mass
destruction. The goal is to verify the existence of such weapons, to
destroy them, and that takes time.
How much time? We'll see. We can't say
at this point. You must remember that this mission of Mr. Blix and Mr.
ElBaradei enables us, as it's been said, to freeze Iraq's entire
capacity to advance towards building weapons of mass destruction.
According to them, the practical effect
of the inspections is first of all to freeze Iraq's capacity to
continue its programs if they exist and then to verify progressively,
more specifically, what they are. And that takes time.
(What does Iraq have? Everything it has
comes from here, from the West, and so you know perfectly well what
weapons they have?)
Each state comes to this inspection
phase with its intelligence. We said that we had useful information
which we've supplied to Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei. With that said,
they are looking not only for weapons of mass destruction but also for
weapons programs, and this concept is fairly broad. Iraq's disarmament
presupposes having the complete picture on the situation in Iraq, not
just identifying the weapons but also the procedures, the processes
and programs that lead to the manufacture of these weapons.
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