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Since December 1998,
United Nations disarmament inspectors have no longer been present in
Iraq. For nearly four years now, the international community has not
been able to verify whether Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction
and whether it is pursuing programmes to that end.
By refusing to allow
the return of United Nations inspectors, Iraq has defied the
international community and the authority of the Security Council.
Even though France does not possess irrefutable proof, there are
several indications that Iraq has used this situation to pursue or
resume its prohibited programmes, notably in the chemical and
biological areas. The behaviour of the Baghdad authorities has given
rise to strong suspicions in this regard.
This situation cannot
be tolerated. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
their delivery systems, in Iraq or elsewhere, constitutes a serious
threat to international security. In the face of this challenge, it is
the Security Council's duty to place firmness and lucidity in the
service of a common objective. For France, that objective is the
disarmament of Iraq. This implies the return of the inspectors and the
resumption of monitoring on the ground.
On 16 September, Iraq,
under unanimous pressure from the international community and thanks
to the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General and the
Secretary General of the League of Arab States, agreed to the
unconditional return of the inspectors. During discussions conducted
in Vienna by the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Baghdad
confirmed this decision. Practical arrangements were made for carrying
out inspections. UNMOVIC and the IAEA must now return to Iraq as soon
as possible. The United Nations must verify the sincerity of its
commitments. In the light of past experience, the international
community cannot be satisfied with words alone. Iraq must translate
its promises into concrete, verifiable and lasting acts.
Here and there, doubts
and reservations have been expressed about the inspectors' ability to
fulfil their mission. France has the greatest confidence in the
ability of Mr Blix and Mr ElBaradei to achieve the mandate entrusted
to them by the Security Council with the utmost rigour and
professionalism. In any case, there is no reason to question the
effectiveness of their teams a priori, as the inspection regime
established under resolution 1284 (1999) has not yet been tested on
the ground.
Furthermore, the
outcome of United Nations inspections has been very positive. It is a
fact that United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors
destroyed more weapons of mass destruction between 1991 and 1998 than
did the military operations during the Gulf War. In 1998, the IAEA
believed it had succeeded in dismantling the Iraqi nuclear programme.
It was not the
inspections that failed, but the international community's ability to
enforce its decisions in a sufficiently firm and united manner.
France, however, is fully disposed to support measures strengthening
the inspection regime, insofar as that proves necessary to facilitate
the inspectors' work. The question of immediate access to the
presidential sites, for example, must be examined by the Security
Council.
On the other hand, we
reject measures that would in fact multiply the risk of incidents
without improving the effectiveness of the work carried out by UNMOVIC
and the IAEA. We also set store by the multinational, independent
nature of the inspectors; any measure countering this fundamental
element would be tantamount to repeating past mistakes and would not
have our support.
Finally, it is the
opinion of Mr Blix and Mr ElBaradei - that is, those who will have to
lead the inspections on the ground - that should guide the Security
Council in its choices. It is up to them to determine what would help
them achieve their mission. Our duty is to assist them, not to
complicate their task.
France attaches
importance to the principle of collective security, which lies at the
heart of the functioning of our Organization and the international
order. The Iraqi question cannot be an exception. That is why we are
proposing a two-stage approach. During the first stage, the Security
Council should adopt a resolution clearly specifying the "rules
of the game". It would define the inspection regime with a view
to ensuring that the inspectors can accomplish their mission fully and
without any hindrance. This resolution should also send a clear
warning to Iraq that the Council will not tolerate new violations.
During the second
stage, if UNMOVIC or the IAEA observe that Iraq is refusing to
cooperate fully with inspectors, the Security Council would meet
immediately to decide on the appropriate measures to take, without
ruling out anything a priori.
France believes that
this approach, which is also the one proposed by the Secretary-General
in his message to the Council, is the only one that can offer us the
unity, cohesion, fairness and legitimacy so crucial to the
effectiveness of our action.
The unity of the
Security Council is absolutely vital. In the past, Iraq has taken
advantage of divisions within the international community to renege on
its obligations and defy the Council's authority. Only a united front
will convince it not to repeat this error. Only a two-stage approach
will allow us to preserve our Council's unity; any kind of "automaticity"
in the use of force will profoundly divide us.
The two-stage approach
is, rather, the choice of cohesion. United in sending Iraq a message
of firmness in an initial resolution, the Security Council will, we
have no doubt, remain united to assume all of its responsibilities
during the second stage, should Iraq violate its commitments.
The Security Council
must also demonstrate fairness by showing Iraq that war is not
inevitable if it fully and scrupulously fulfils its obligations. This
new behaviour would open the way to the suspension and then the
lifting of sanctions, in accordance with Security Council resolutions.
Finally, given the
gravity of the situation, in which nothing less than peace or war is
at stake, it is essential for the Security Council to remain in charge
of the process every step of the way. This is fundamental for the
legitimacy of our action and essential for maintaining unanimous
support for our common objectives.
This debate constitutes
an important, perhaps even cardinal, moment for our Council and,
beyond that, for our Organization. What is at stake in the ongoing
negotiations is fundamental: even beyond Iraq, we are talking about
the future of the international order, relations between North and
South, and notably, our relationship with the Arab world. An action of
uncertain legitimacy, one that does not enjoy the support of the
international community, would not be understood and could gravely
affect these relations.
By placing this action
within the framework of collective security, the French approach aims
to ensure its legitimacy and effectiveness, while respecting the
principles defined by the United Nations Charter./.
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