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Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters**Strengthening of the United Nations system****Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit****Note verbale dated 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to enclose the document entitled "Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations system", prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica, as a contribution to current efforts to reform and revitalize the Security Council and the United Nations at large (see annex).

The Permanent Mission of Costa Rica would like to request that the document be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 53, 54 and 55.

Annex to the note verbale dated 24 June 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Security Council enlargement and the cascade effect: enlargement of the permanent member category and its effects on the United Nations system

The present working paper is an effort to examine the possible effects of Security Council enlargement, in the Permanent Member category, on the opportunities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system. It primarily concentrates on what is commonly known as the 'Cascade Effect' and its collateral impact on the possibilities and opportunities of the broader membership to be elected to various United Nations organs.

The purpose of this paper is not to call into question the status or the privileges enjoyed by the current Permanent Members, although that is an issue that might deserve consideration in its own right, but only to sound a note of warning regarding the Cascade Effect as it would relate to any future enlargement in the Permanent Member category. Costa Rica believes that it is necessary to seriously examine this issue, as any extension of the Cascade Effect could potentially affect the sense of collective ownership which necessarily underlies the United Nations.

The Cascade Effect arises from the structural political and legal advantages that Permanent Members enjoy as a result of their permanency in the Security Council. In some cases, these electoral advantages are enshrined in legal norms, such as the requirement that judges to the International Court of Justice be simultaneously but separately elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In other cases, they arise from collateral political influence, such as the customary practice that every Permanent Member is entitled to have at least one national appointed at the Under-Secretary-General level in key departments of the United Nations.

The statistical evidence presented below proves that Permanent Members in the Security Council have generally enjoyed continuous membership in all the key organs and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations system and have had the added benefit of having nationals continuously appointed to the most senior staff positions. The limited exceptions are mostly confined to the transitional period regarding the representation of China (1960s and early 1970s) and to the adoption of voluntary rotation arrangements within the European Union (late 1990s).

For the broader United Nations membership, the Cascade Effect has a tangible negative impact. By excluding, *de iure* or *de facto*, a certain number of seats from those available for open election and rotation, or appointment by the Secretary-General in the case of senior posts, the Cascade Effect substantially reduces the opportunities of Member States or their nationals to serve in various United Nations organs. For all intents and purposes, Permanent

Members of the Security Council displace all other Member States from seats and posts that should, respectively, be open to democratic election by Member States or appointment by the Secretary-General. The precise impact of the Cascade Effect on each seat varies in relation to the total number of seats available for election in each organ. Similarly, it varies on each post in relation to the total number of posts to be appointed by the Secretary-General. Therefore, although comprehensive in its grasp, the Cascade Effect can manifest itself differently in each case.

When considering the expansion of the Security Council and, in particular, the possible creation of new Permanent Members, it is necessary to examine whether new Permanent Members would enjoy the advantages that arise from the Cascade Effect. Without proper safeguards to correct the legal and political factors that give rise to it-- for example, a firm binding commitment otherwise-- the Cascade Effect will, in all likelihood, extend its asphyxiating grasp on the opportunities and possibilities for the broader membership to be represented in the various organs of the United Nations system.

Statistical Findings

The Cascade Effect is a rather understudied phenomenon, although its ramifications can be felt throughout the United Nations system. There have been few previous attempts to examine it (probably the most notable, albeit confined to an analysis of the 1984-1993 period, was submitted by Argentina during UNGA49 in 1995 and circulated as part of document A/49/965), and not a single attempt that comprehensively extrapolates its full force and scope since 1946. Therefore, to fill in that void, the following analysis seeks to demonstrate, on a case by case basis, and in quantitative and comparative terms, the full force and scope of the Cascade Effect since 1946 and its probable future effects if there is an enlargement in the Permanent Member category.

For simplicity, the working paper takes enlargement in the Permanent Member category to mean 6 new additional Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A of the High-Level Panel Report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" and the "In Larger Freedom" Report by the Secretary-General. This should not be construed, in any way, as an endorsement of Model A.

1. Economic and Social Council and Subsidiary Bodies

1.1 Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1961-1971), Permanent Members have served continuously on the ECOSOC since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947. Of all the elective organs within the United Nations Systems, the ECOSOC is one organ where the Cascade Effect is most evident.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%
United Kingdom	1947-2005	98.3%
China	1946-1960, 1972-2005	81.7%

Of the 54 seats in the ECOSOC, 5 [9.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.7% to 79.6% of the seats.**

1.2 Commission on Human Rights [CHR]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1964-1981), and just 4 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Human Rights since its creation in 1946 or immediately after in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-1976, 1978-2005	98.3%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	98.3%
United States	1947-2001, 2003-2005	96.7%
United Kingdom	1947-1978, 1980-1990, 1992-2005	95.0%
China	1947-1963, 1982-2005	68.3%

Of the 53 seats in the CHR, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

1.3 Commission on Narcotic Drugs [CND]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1970-1985), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Narcotic Drugs since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1946-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
China	1946-1969, 1986-2005	73.3%

Of the 53 seats in the CND, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

1.4 Commission on Population and Development [CPD]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1981, while another Permanent Member has not been a member since 2001), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Population and Development since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-2001	93.2%
China	1947-1967, 1982-2005	78.0%

Of the 47 seats in the CPD, 5 [10.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.4% to 76.6% of the seats.**

1.5 Committee for Program and Coordination [CPC]

With the exception of one Permanent Member that began to serve in 1987, all Permanent Members have served continuously in the Committee for Program and Coordination since its creation in 1973 or immediately after in 1974.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1973-2005	100.0%
France	1974-2005	96.9%
Russian Federation	1974-2005	96.9%
United States	1974-2005	96.9%
China	1987-2005	62.5%

Of the 34 seats in the CPC, 5 [14.7%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [32.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 85.3% to 67.6% of the seats.**

1.6 Commission on Social Development [CSoD]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve in 1965 and between 1969-1988, another Permanent Member has not served since 1983), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Social Development since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
China	1947-1964, 1966-1968, 1989-2005	64.4%
United Kingdom	1947-1982	61.0%

Of the 46 seats in the CSoD, 5 [10.9%] seats have been affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats.**

1.7 Commission on Sustainable Development [CSD]

All Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on Sustainable Development since its creation in 1993.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1993-2005	100.0%
France	1993-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1993-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1993-2005	100.0%
United States	1993-2005	100.0%

Of the 53 seats in the CSD, 5 [9.4%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [20.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 90.6% to 79.2% of the seats.**

1.8 Commission on the Status of Women [CSW]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1972 and between 1977-1979, while another did not serve between 1987-1996), and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Commission on the Status of Women since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1947-1983, 1985-2005	98.3%
United States	1947-1994, 1996-2005	98.3%
China	1947-1963, 1965-1967, 1973-1976, 1980-2005	84.7%
United Kingdom	1947-1986, 1997-2005	83.1%

Of the 45 seats in the CSW, 5 [11.1%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [24.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.9% to 75.6% of the seats.**

1.9 Statistical Commission

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1969-1986), and just 3 one to three-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Statistical Commission since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-1981, 1984-2005	96.6%
France	1947-1980, 1982-1997, 2001-2004	91.5%
China	1947-1967, 1984-2003	67.8%

Of the 24 seats in the Statistical Commission, 5 [20.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [45.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 79.2% to 54.2% of the seats.**

2. UN Funds and Programmes Executive Boards and Councils

2.1 United Nations Development Programme Executive Board [UNDP]

With just 4 one-year gaps and 1 two-year gap, Permanent Members have served continuously in the UNDP Executive Board since its creation in 1994.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1994-2005	100.0%
United States	1994-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1994-1995, 1997-2005	90.0%
France	1994-1995, 1997-1998, 2000-2003	60.0%
United Kingdom	1994-1995, 1997-1999, 2002-2004	60.0%

Of the 36 seats on the UNDP Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats.**

2.2 United Nations Environment Programme Governing Council [UNEP]

Permanent Members have served continuously on the UNEP Governing Council since its creation in 1973.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1973-2005	100.0%
France	1973-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1973-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1973-2005	100.0%
United States	1973-2005	100.0%

Of the 58 seats on the UNEP Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats.**

2.3 United Nations Human Settlements Programme Governing Council [UN-Habitat]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1989), Permanent Members have served continuously on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council since its creation in 1977 or immediately after in 1978.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1977-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1978-2005	96.4%
United Kingdom	1978-2005	96.4%
United States	1978-2005	96.4%
China	1989-2005	58.6%

Of the 58 seats on the UN-HABITAT Governing Council, 5 [8.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [19.0%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 91.4% to 81.0% of the seats.**

2.4 United Nations Children's Fund Executive Board [UNICEF]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1958 and then did not serve between 1974-1979), and just 4 one to two-year gaps, Permanent Members have served in the UNICEF Executive Board since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-2005	100.0%
France	1946-1996, 1998-1999, 2001-2005	96.7%
United Kingdom	1946-1996, 1998-2000, 2003-2005	95.0%
China	1958-1973, 1980-2005	70.0%

Of the 36 seats on the UNICEF Executive Board, 5 [13.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.1% to 69.4% of the seats.**

3. International Court of Justice [ICJ]

With one exception (nationals of one Permanent Member did not serve between 1968-1984), nationals of Permanent Members have served continuously in the International Court of Justice since 1946. Judges in the ICJ are elected by the Security Council and the General Assembly in separate but simultaneous elections.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY	
France	J. Basdevant	1946-1964	100.0%
	A. Gross	1964-1984	
	G. Ladreit de Lacharrière	1982-1987	
	G. Guillaume	1987-2004	
	R. Abraham	2004-2005	
Russian Federation	S. B. Krylov	1946-1952	100.0%
	S. A. Golunsky	1952-1953	
	F. I. Kojevnikov	1953-1961	
	V. M. Koretsky	1961-1970	
	P. D. Morosov	1970-1985	
	N. K. Tarassov	1985-1994	
	V. S. Vereshchentin	1995-2005	
United Kingdom	Sir Arnold McNair	1946-1955	100.0%
	Sir Hersch Lauterpacht	1955-1960	
	Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice	1960-1973	
	Sir Humphrey Waldock	1973-1981	
	Sir Robert Jennings	1982-1995	
	Dame Rosalyn Higgins	1995-2005	
United States	G. H. Hackworth	1946-1961	100.0%
	P. C. Jessup	1961-1970	
	H. C. Dillard	1970-1979	
	R. R. Baxter	1979-1980	
	S. M. Schwebel	1980-2000	
	T. Buergenthal	2000-2005	
China	Hsu Mo	1946-1956	66.0%
	V. K. Wellington Koo	1957-1967	
	Ni Zhengyu	1985-1994	
	Shi Jiuyong	1994 -2005	

Of the 15 seats on the ICJ, 5 [33.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [73.3%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 66.7% to a mere 26.7% of the seats.**

4. UN Specialized Agencies

4.1 Food and Agriculture Organization Council [FAO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972) and 1 one-year gap, Permanent Members have served in the FAO Council consecutively since its creation in 1947. The Russian Federation is not included for it is not a member of FAO.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-1955, 1957-2005	96.5%
China	1947-1948, 1973-2005	73.1%

Of the 49 seats on the FAO Council, 5 [10.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [22.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.8% to 77.6% of the seats.**

4.2 International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors [IAEA]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1984), Permanent Members have served continuously on the IAEA Board of Governors since its creation in 1957.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1957-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1957-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1957-2005	100.0%
United States	1957-2005	100.0%
China	1984-2005	42.6%

Of the 35 seats on the IAEA Board of Governors, 5 [14.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [31.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 85.7% to 68.6% of the seats.**

4.3 International Civil Aviation Organization Council [ICAO]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1972 while another did not serve until 1974), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United Kingdom	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1948-2005	98.2%
Russian Federation	1972-2005	57.1%
China	1974-2005	53.6%

Of the 36 seats on the ICAO Council, 5 [13.8%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [30.6%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.2% to 69.4% of the seats.**

4.4 International Maritime Organization Council [IMO]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1975) and just 2 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Maritime Organization since its creation in 1959.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1959-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1959-2005	100.0%
United States	1959-2005	100.0%
China	1975-81, 1983-87, 1989-2005	63.0%

Of the 40 seats on the IMO Council, 5 [12.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [27.5%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 87.5% to 72.5% of the seats.**

4.5 International Telecommunications Union Council [ITU]

With one exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1990-1993 and has not served since 2003), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Council of the International Telecommunications Union since its creation in 1947.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1947-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1947-2005	100.0%
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1947-1989, 1994-2002	86.6%

Of the 46 seats on the ITU Council, 5 [10.9%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [23.9%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 89.1% to 76.1% of the seats.**

4.6 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council

Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons since its creation in 1997 or immediately after in 1998.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
China	1997-2005	100.0%
France	1997-2005	100.0%
United Kingdom	1997-2005	100.0%
United States	1997-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1998-2005	88.8%

Of the 41 seats on the OPCW Executive Council, 5 [12.2%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [26.8%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 87.8% to 73.2% of the seats.**

4.7 World Health Organization Executive Board [WHO]

With two exception (one Permanent Member did not serve between 1949-1972 and then from 1986-1989 and another that did not serve between 1951-1957) and just 3 one-year gaps, Permanent Members have served on the Executive Board of the World Health Organization since its creation in 1947 or immediately after in 1948.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
United States	1947-2005	100.0%
France	1948-2001, 2003-2005	94.8%
United Kingdom	1947-1999, 2001-2004	94.8%
Russian Federation	1948-1950, 1958-2005	86.2%
China	1947-48, 1973-76, 1978-85, 1990-2005	50.0%

Of the 32 seats on the WHO Executive Board, 5 [15.6%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [34.4%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 84.4% to 65.6% of the seats.**

4.8 World Meteorological Organization Executive Council [WMO]

With two exceptions (one Permanent Member did not serve until 1973 and another did not serve until 1979), Permanent Members have served continuously on the Executive Council of the World Meteorological Organization since its creation in 1951.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
France	1951-2005	100.0%
Russian Federation	1951-2005	100.0%
United States	1951-2005	100.0%
China	1973-2005	60.7%
United Kingdom	1979-2005	50.0%

Of the 37 seats on the WMO Executive Council, 5 [13.5%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [29.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 86.5% to 70.3% of the seats.**

4.9 International Labor Organization Governing Body [ILO]

The continuity of the Permanent Members in the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization is guaranteed as they hold non-elective seats as “states of chief industrial importance”. This status only extends to 5 other Member States. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case.

5. General Assembly Subsidiary Bodies

5.1 General Committee

By virtue of resolution 33/138 of 1978, 5 of the 21 Vice-Presidents of the General Assembly are representatives of the Permanent Members and thereby members of the General Committee. The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, is uncertain and cannot be easily ascertained in this case.

5.2 Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [ACABQ]

With one exception (nationals from one Permanent Member did not serve between 1952-1971) and several minor gaps (2 one-year gaps, 6 three-year gaps, 1 four-year gap, and 1 five-year gap), nationals from Permanent Members have served continuously on the ACABQ since its creation in 1946.

PERMANENT MEMBER	TERMS	CONTINUITY
Russian Federation	1946-2005	100.0%
United States	1946-1996, 2000-2005	94.9%
France	1946-1983, 1987-1989, 1993-1995, 1997-2002	84.7%
United Kingdom	1946-1980, 1984-1986, 1991-1993, 1999-2004	78.0%
China	1946-1951, 1972-1998, 2002-2005	61.1%

Of the 16 seats in the ACABQ, 5 [31.3%] seats are affected by the Cascade Effect. This could increase to a total of 11 [68.7%] seats with the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, reducing opportunities for the broader membership **from 68.7% to 31.3% of the seats.**

6. United Nations Secretariat

Permanent Members have customarily had one or more nationals serving in the most senior positions within the United Nations, typically at the Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General level. Moreover, at times several nationals from a single Permanent Member have monopolized the most senior positions within a particular department, and at times a Permanent Member has traded off one department for another, as is evidenced in part by the following (this is not a comprehensive or exhaustive listing):

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
China	Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self Governing Territories	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1946-1953
	Department of General Assembly Affairs and predecessors	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1954-1961
	Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors	
	Victor Hoo Chi Tsai	1962-1972
	Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization	
	Tang Ming-chao	1972-1978
	Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors	
	Bi Jilong	1979-1984
	Xie Qimei	1985-1990
	Ji Chaozhu	1991-1992
Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors		
Ji Chaozhu	1992	
Technical Cooperation for Development and predecessors		
Ji Chaozhu	1993-1995	
Jin Yongjian	1996	
Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services		
Jin Yongjian	1997-2001	
Chen Jian	2001-	
France	Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors	
	Henri Laugier	1946-1950
	Guillaume Georges-Picot	1951-1954
	Philippe de Seynes	1955-1974
	Gabriel van Laetham	1974-1978

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS	
France [cont.]	Jean-Louis Ripert	1978-1990	
	Antoine Blanca	1989-1992	
	Jean-Claude Milleron	1993-1996	
	United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General		
	Antoine Blanca	1992-1993	
	Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]		
	Bernard Miyet	1997-2000	
	Jean-Marie Guehenno	2000-	
	Russian Federation	Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors	
		Constantin E. Zinchenko	1949-1952
Ilya S. Tchernychev		1953-1954	
Anatoly F. Dobrynin		1958-1959	
Georgy P. Arkadev		1960-1961	
Evgeny D. Kiselev		1962	
Vladimir P. Suslov		1963-1964	
Alexei E. Nesterenko		1965-1967	
Leonid N. Kutakov		1968-1972	
Arkady N. Shevchenko		1973-1977	
Department of Political Affairs [DPA] or predecessors			
Mikhail D. Sytenko		1978-1980	
Viacheslav A. Ustinov		1981-1986	
Vasilij S. Safronchuk		1987-1991	
Vladimir Petrovsky		1992-1993	
United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General			
Vladimir Petrovsky		1993-2002	
Sergei Ordzhonikidze		2002-	
United Kingdom		Department for Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors	
		Sir Arthur David K. Owen	1946-1954
	United Nations Office in Geneva [UNOG], Director General		
	Sir Arthur Rucker	1953	
	Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors		
Sir Humphrey Trevelyan	1958		

PERMANENT MEMBER	DEPARTMENT HEADS	TERMS
United Kingdom [cont.]	Department of Management [DM] and predecessors	
	Andrew A. Stark	1968-1970
	Horatio K. Matthews	1971-1972
	Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors	
	Sir Brian Urquhart	1974-1986
	Marrack I. Goulding	1986-1992
	Department of Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessors	
	Marrack I. Goulding	1993-1996
	Sir Kieran Prendergast	1997-2005
	Department of Safety and Security	
	David Veness	2005-
	Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet	
	Mark Malloch Brown	2005-
United States	Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Chef de Cabinet	
	Andrew W. Cordier	1946-1961
	Department of Management [DM] and predecessors	
	Byron Price	1946-1953
	Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO] and predecessors	
	Ralph J. Bunche	1955-1970
	Department for Political Affairs [DPA] and predecessors	
	F. Bradford Morse	1972-1975
	William B. Buffum	1976-1986
	Joseph Verner Reed	1987-1988
	Ronald I. Spiers	1989-1991
	Department of Management [DM] and predecessors	
	Dick Thornburgh	1992
Melissa Wells	1993	
Joseph E. Connor	1994-2002	
Catherine Bertini	2003-2005	
Christopher Bancroft Burnham	2005-	

The compounded impact of the Cascade Effect on appointments at the most senior level, through the addition of 6 new Permanent Members as contemplated in Model A, cannot be easily ascertained.

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