



On Foreign Policy

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Even a hegemon needs friends and allies

Financial Times, 09/14/01
by Moises Naim – Editor of
Foreign Policy magazine

The terrorist attacks have sparked new ideas that will inform debates and shape policies. The main one is the need to wage a global war against terrorism. Terrorism has always existed and will not be eradicated. In fact, by increasing the terrorists' mobility, agility and global reach, globalisation has made them much tougher adversaries. In the foreseeable future there will be no foreign policy priority more important for the US than defeating terrorists. Yet before Tuesday the US was facing, in addition to terrorist threats, myriad other

challenges for which it had no obvious response. It still is.

While the Nato alliance has unequivocally and strongly supported the US, multiple rifts and disagreements on issues including missile defence and the Kyoto agreement - still plague the relationship between Europe and the US. In a few months, the World Trade Organisation summit in Doha will highlight the sorry state of the world's trade regime and the need for the US to build and to lead a coalition that could break the stalemate that has paralysed trade talks for years.

The good news is that another idea rising from the

ashes of Tuesday's tragedy is that even a superpower cannot afford to go it alone. Many of the unilateralist instincts that were so much in evidence at the beginning of the Bush administration will, one hopes, now be tempered by the realisation that the long-term fight against terrorism requires close co-operation with other countries. That lesson will come in handy when the need to deal with the other foreign policy challenges facing the US arises. Few if any of the problems listed above can be effectively confronted by America acting alone. We all need friends and allies. Even a hegemon.

No Choice

The New Republic,
09/20/01
by Lawrence Kaplan

The discovery last week that America must still contend with cruel and resourceful foes has generated a certain fatalism, particularly among elites. Dubious that America's dominion can be sustained under assault, leading opinion makers have presented Americans with a list of phony choices. The United States, they claim, can't defend against missiles and terrorists. It can't fight terrorists conventionally and unconventionally. It can't wage a war

against terrorism and uphold its competing obligations abroad. But the United States can do all of these things. Indeed, it has no choice.

The best defense, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told last week, "is an effective offense." He's right. But what sort of offense? According to a chorus of leading opinion makers, here the United States faces a second stark choice: Either it can respond to terror with its conventional war-fighting capabilities, which won't work, or with unconventional means, which it doesn't do very well. Plotting strategy from the cheese line at Zabar's, the editorial writers at

The New York Times have let it be known that they find the "war talk we have heard from Washington ... disconcerting," as the Bush team hasn't the slightest clue "what sort of war this will be and how the United States can ensure that it prevails." Equally disconcerted, Stanford historian David Kennedy finds America "rendered the victim of an elusive foe impervious to the military might we have spent decades building" and against which "our conventional arsenal is all but useless." In this telling, our enemy is formless, invisible, ineffable.

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Council on Foreign Relations (think tank)
www.cfr.org

The roots of hatred



“Whatever its mistakes, the idea that America brought the onslaught upon itself is absurd”

The Economist
Sep 20th 2001

Whatever their grievances, nothing could excuse an attack of such ferocity and size. So what explains it? A surprising number of people, and not just gullible fanatics looking for someone to hold responsible for the hopelessness of their lives, believe that to a greater or lesser extent America has reaped as it sowed. If this charge is to be taken at all seriously, it must first be separated from the general anti-Americanism fashionable in some left-wing circles in Europe, say, or even Latin America. It may be reasonable to dislike the death penalty, a society so ready to tolerate guns, even the vigour of a culture that finds its expression in unpretentious movies and McDonald's hamburgers, but none of these could conceivably explain, let alone justify, a single act of terrorism. Similarly, though globalisation clearly arouses fury among protesters, and concern among some more moderate critics, it would be ridiculous to think that last week's attack was prompted by any American antipathy towards welfare payments, closed economies or re-

straints on speculative capital movements.

The charge that in politics the United States is arrogant, even hypocritical, may deserve more notice. America has recently brushed aside some good international agreements (on nuclear testing, for example, a world criminal court, land mines), as well as dismissing some bad ones (the Kyoto convention on global warming) with an insouciance unbecoming to the world's biggest producer of greenhouse gases. Its understandable determination to pursue a missile shield threatens to upend the system of deterrence and arms control that has so far saved the world from nuclear Armageddon. It has refused to pay its dues to the United Nations, even as it has cut its aid for the world's poorest. Its eagerness to prosecute African and Balkan war criminals while refusing to allow its own nationals to submit to an international court has made it seem unwilling to hold itself to the standards it imposes on others.

America defends its interests, sometimes skilfully, sometimes clumsily, just as other countries do. Since

power, like nature, abhors a vacuum, it steps into places where disorder reigns. On the whole, it should do so more, not less, often. Of all the great powers in history, it is probably the least territorial, the most idealistic. Muslims in particular should note that the armed interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, both led by America, were attacks on Christian regimes in support of Muslim victims. In neither did the United States stand to make any material gain; in neither were its vital interests, conventionally defined, at stake. Those who criticise America's leadership of the world's capitalist system—a far from perfect affair—should remember that it has brought more wealth and better living standards to more people than any other in history. And those who regret America's triumph in the cold war should stop to think how the world would look if the Soviet Union had won. America's policies may have earned it enemies. But in truth, it is difficult to find plausible explanations for the virulence of last week's attacks, except in the envy, hatred and moral confusion of those who plotted and perpetrated them.



BOOK REVIEWS

by Philip Zelikow, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001

Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change.

By the United States Commission On National Security/21st century.

Chartered by Congress as the most comprehensive national security review in half a century, the Hart-Rudman Commission (named for its chairs, former Senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart) has issued three reports since 1999. The first report highlighted emerging issues for the next quarter-century, predicting a future much like the present, in which the United States is increasingly threatened by unconventional forms of attack. The second report called for more coherent national strategies to build coalitions and defend both the United States and vital international networks in areas such as energy and communications. This latest and final report focuses on how Washington institutions should adapt. The merits of a few of the report's ideas are already apparent and consequently have been adopted. In other cases, such as organizing homeland defense, the commission has helped consolidate an emerging consensus. Its thoughtful proposals, such as those for the Department of Defense, should aid the ongoing review. The recurrent hope throughout is that someone, somewhere, will animate the leftover institutions of the Cold War's national security state with fresher and more purposeful strategic direction.

Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy.

By Paul R. Pillar. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2001

A veteran of counterterrorism work at the CIA, Pillar wants less attention paid to glamorous threats such as weapons of mass destruction and more care given to the steady, incremental jobs done each day to track and contain the problems that will never really go away. Pillar thinks a "tough" policy on terrorism is often too simplistic, and he counsels less reliance on force and more attention to international cooperation and diplomatic prevention. He therefore suggests that counterterrorism concerns should emerge from their compartment to become mainstream elements in U.S. foreign policy thinking. But this book is not meant for those looking for advice about U.S. policy toward Iran, Afghanistan, or any other state. The book's strength is its nuanced sense of how Washington's counterterrorism policy actually works, day in and day out.

How the west should fight its war

Financial Times
September 25, 2001
By James Rubin

The Bush administration has now successfully established a global coalition against terrorism. The larger challenge ahead will be to

sustain that coalition as military action begins in Afghanistan, especially if overthrowing the Taliban becomes America's political objective. The administration is right in its decision to present evidence that the bin Laden organisation was in-

deed responsible for the September 11 attacks. That presentation should be done publicly, perhaps through the United Nations, as well as in private discussions with key governments where critical intelligence information can be shared.

"The US must establish specific military and law enforcement objectives", says James Rubin, former assistant secretary of state.

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The War on Terror Is Not New

The New York Times - September 20, 2001

By NIALL FERGUSON, professor of political and financial history at Oxford, author of "The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World."

OXFORD, England – (...)It is grounded in the fear that the United States does not know what it is getting into. This is not a war like World War II. It is a continuation of a war against terrorism that Europeans have been waging for more than 30 years. In this war, Americans are novices.

If making war on terrorists were simple, the forces of the I.R.A. and E.T.A. would have been smoked out and hunted down long ago. But terrorist organizations are not nation-states that can be vanquished in conventional war. To have defeated the I.R.A. in the 1970's, the British government would have had to adopt policies — like the internment of all Republican suspects — that could not easily have been reconciled with liberal ideas of justice. Nor should it be forgotten that the lion's share of the money that financed the I.R.A. campaign of violence came from the United States. Not even the most extreme Unionists were prepared to bomb Boston in retaliation.

The fear of indiscriminate retaliation by the United States is particularly acute in countries like France, Holland, Britain and Germany, which all have substantial Muslim populations. Only a tiny minority may respond to calls for a jihad, but that is reason enough for Europeans to feel nervous about American talk of a "crusade."

George W. Bush may well grow impatient with Europeans' urging him to be cautious. But their hesitations must not be dismissed as faintheartedness. Americans must steel themselves for a long, inglorious kind of war that governments in Europe already know only too well.

US Department of State - Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC - September 20, 2001



The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance ("TIAR" or "Rio Treaty") grew out of the perceived need to provide a collective security mechanism for the hemisphere during the run-up to the Second World War. Although the groundwork for the treaty was laid during the war, the treaty was not adopted until the Third Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1947. The treaty entered into force in 1948. Since then, it has served as one of the pillars of the collective hemispheric defense architecture.

The Rio Treaty is a "special treaty" within the meaning of Article 29 of the OAS Charter. Among other things, it defines the measures and procedures governing a collective response by the other states party when a state party suffers an armed attack or an aggression that is not an armed attack. The Treaty has been invoked on 19 occasions since its inception, the most recent being 1982.

The Rio Treaty provides for a collective security mechanism. Under its terms, an armed attack on one member is to be considered an attack on all. The treaty also provides for measures to address aggressions that are not armed attacks, as well as for extracontinental or intracontinental conflicts, or "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

Not all OAS member states are parties to the Treaty. The United States is a party to the Rio Treaty, along with Argentina, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cuba is also a party although its present government has been suspended from OAS participation since 1962.